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ABSTRACT 
Through the perspective of Wayne P. Hughes' missile salvo 
equation, this research examined naval surface forces of 
the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States 
in order to demonstrate how American surface combatants can 
defeat PRC anti-access area denial (A2AD) measures in the 
South China Sea (SCS). Hughes' equation reveals that 
advantages for American surface forces are obtained by 
increasing fleet numbers, counter-targeting (CT), and 
increased scouting. This thesis advocates fleet growth as 
articulated in Hughes' New Navy Fighting Machine (NNFM) 
study. Comparisons of the NNFM, the U.S. fleet, and the PRC 
fleet demonstrate both the disparity facing the American 
surface forces, and the near parity obtained in the NNFM. 
CT through unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), and naval 
obscurants provide American surface forces increased 
staying power and tactical advantage. Scouting and 
communications networking through a theater wide 
constellation of airships provide the American fleet with 
persistent situational awareness of the battle space, 
tactical communications with subsurface forces, and 
improved emissions control (EMCON) measures for surface 
forces. The distributive properties of the NNFM, combined 
with this study's CT and scouting findings, offer American 
surface combatants success over the PRC Navy in the SCS 
scenario.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate how 
American surface forces can defeat potent Chinese anti-
access area denial (A2AD) measures in the unfortunate event 
of conflict in the South China Sea (SCS). To focus this 
thesis, only the contributions of the People's Republic of 
China (PRC) and the United States (U.S.) naval surface 
forces are addressed. The setting, the SCS, requires one to 
consider predominantly the inputs of maritime assets.1 
Improving America's chance at success lies in understanding 
the factors of naval warfare as delineated by Wayne P. 
Hughes' missile salvo equation.2 Following discussions of 
those factors, improvements to the fleet based on 
exploiting such elements are presented. To frame the topic, 
political and naval considerations affecting China and 
America are examined. It is determined that American 
disadvantages caused by apprehension to losing potential 
capital ships and an aversion to striking first can be 
surmounted by the distributed composition of the New Navy 
Fighting Machine (NNFM) study3 as employed in this thesis. 
                     
 
1 "China's growing military and economic weight is beginning to 
produce a more assertive posture, particularly in the maritime domain." 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military 
and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2011 
(Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2011) 15. 
2 For a complete discussion on modern naval warfare see: Wayne P. 
Hughes, Jr., Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 2000). 
3 For a complete discussion on a more distributed fleet see: Wayne P. 
Hughes, Jr., "The New Navy Fighting Machine: A Study of the Connections 
Between Contemporary Policy, Strategy, Sea Power, Naval Operations, and 





A. CONSIDERATIONS FOR POTENTIAL ARMED CONFLICT 
1. International Contention in the South China Sea 
The western Pacific is home to many areas of growing 
contention. In the past, a predominant concern of the U.S. 
centered upon potential PRC military aggression towards 
Taiwan. However, speculation over oil and gas reserves 
embedded in the SCS has increasingly drawn attention to the 
waters between Vietnam and the Philippines. Claims 
assertions have already generated tensions between 
Southeastern Asian neighbors and have the potential to grow 
into armed conflict as the PRC increases their level of 
force within the region.4 Involvement in the SCS region is 
intended to uphold international maritime law5 and the 
rights of countries less able to defend themselves. 
a. PRC's SCS Perspective 
Beginning in 1935, government sources within 
China began drawing charts with dashed lines surrounding 
the SCS declaring those waters distinctively China's.6 In 
1949, the PRC published maps similar to the one seen in 
                     
 
4 "For states that ring the South China Sea, its waters represent a 
zone of rich hydrocarbon and protein resources that are increasingly 
dear on land as populations exhaust their territories’ ability to meet 
their increasing needs. This resource competition alone could be the 
basis of sharp-edged disputes between the claimants." Peter Dutton, 
"Three Disputes and Three Objectives: China and the South China Sea," 
Naval War College Review (Autumn 2011): 42. 
5 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton emphasized freedom of navigation 
in the South China Sea as a "national interest" when speaking to the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum in 2010. 
Gordon Chang, "Hilary Clinton Changes America's China Policy," Forbes, 
July 28, 2010, http://www.forbes.com/2010/07/28/china-beijing-asia-
hillary-clinton-opinions-columnists-gordon-g-chang.html. 




Figure 1. The Chinese claim is that the SCS belongs to the 
PRC and that notion is perhaps more potent today than it 
was 80 years ago.7 However, the nature of claims the Chinese 
mean to exercise in the SCS (sovereign, historical, 
Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ), and so forth) remains 
unclear.8 
  
                     
 
7 Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving 
the People's Republic of China, 15. 





Figure 1.   China's "Historical Waters." The U-shaped Area 
Contained within the Dashes Represents Chinese-
Claimed National Waters Dating to the 1930s. From9 
                     
 




What has been surmised from Chinese actions is a 
policy of jinhai fangyu, meaning "Offshore Defense."10 The 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has defined PRC 
offshore defense as: 
[A]n overarching strategic concept that directs 
the PLA Navy to prepare for three essential 
missions including: keeping the enemy within 
limits and resisting invasion from the sea; 
protecting the nation's territorial sovereignty; 
and, safeguarding the motherland's unity and 
maritime rights.11 
The extent to which China wishes to project this 
manner of defense is estimated to be the "near seas" which 
include the SCS.12 It appears that official Chinese 
objectives for the SCS remain vague in order to curb 
international conflict. This provides the PRC extended room 
to elevate military might in the maritime region—
potentially the focal point for the People's Liberation 
Army—Navy (PLA-N) aircraft carrier program.13 All the while, 
disconnect between rhetoric and action is perhaps intended 
at inching out other maritime forces from the SCS. A firm 




                     
 
10 Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving 
the People's Republic of China, 22.  
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 22-23. 
13 Andrew S. Erickson, Abraham M. Denmark, and Gabriel Collins, 
"Beijing's 'Starter Carrier' and Future Steps: Alternatives and 




when several Chinese fishing trawlers attempted on multiple 
occasions to collide with USNS Victorious and USNS 
Impeccable.14   
Much has been made on potential economic boosts 
control of the natural resources of the SCS may bring to 
the PRC. However, as one begins to balance the cost of 
conducting war, to include commerce lost to enemies, the 
net yield does not appear reason enough for the PRC to risk 
hostile action.  
China is however a country extending back 
millenniums, and it has led the world in many cultural 
regards. It is not beyond reason to estimate that the PRC, 
along with her present economic success, craves 
international prestige. Potentially the greatest way for 
the PRC world standings to rise is to exert opposition to 
the U.S. It is the assumption of this thesis that 
ultimately the maneuverings of the PRC in the SCS is 
intended to increase China's prestige relative to the U.S., 
and more specifically the USN.   
Such a goal is achievable if the PLA-N 
successfully baits the U.S. Navy (USN) into firing first. 
By pulling the trigger and beginning the war, the U.S. 
forfeits moral high ground to the PRC. The outcome of such  
an ensuing battle is significant in terms of human life and 
financial outlay, but the social-political gains would 
already belong to the PRC.  
                     
 
14 Barbara Starr, "Chinese Boats Harassed US Ship, Officials Say," 





b. United States SCS Perspective 
The U.S., in addition to upholding maritime law 
in the SCS as previously discussed, has commitments to 
Eastern Asian allies to fulfill.15 As the 2010 Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR) states: 
Anti-access strategies seek to deny outside 
countries the ability to project power into a 
region, thereby allowing aggression or other 
destabilizing actions to be conducted by the 
anti-access power. Without dominant U.S. 
capabilities to project power, the integrity of 
U.S. alliances and security partnerships could be 
called into question, reducing U.S. security and 
influence and increasing the possibility of 
conflict.16 
As America's prime instrument for balancing power 
in the SCS, the U.S. Navy (USN) is presented with two key 
hurdles it must overcome: fiscal concerns driving the fleet 
to decreasing numbers, and an aversion to risking multi-
billion dollar warships, namely aircraft carriers.17  
At the close of fiscal year 2011, the U.S. 
surface fleet was comprised of 11 carriers (CVN), 
                     
 
15 "America's interests are inextricably linked to the integrity and 
resilience of the international system." Department of Defense, 
Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: Pentagon, February 2010): 
iv. 
16 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 31.  
17 "Little more than 13 years ago, with the public release of the 
U.S. Maritime Strategy, then-Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman Jr. 
effectively argued that a 600-ship Navy was necessary to meet a U.S. 
national-security requirement for maritime superiority. Remarkably, the 
Navy today is on the threshold of falling below 300 ships the smallest 
fleet since 1931." John G. Kinney, and Gordon I. Peterson, "The U.S. 
Engagement Strategy: The Size of the Fleet Really Does Matter!" Navy 
League of the United States, July 28, 2010, http://www.navyleague.org/ 




22 cruisers (CG), 61 destroyers (DDG), 26 frigates (FFG), 
2 littoral combat ships (LCS), 14 minesweepers (MCM), and 
31 amphibious ships.18 Due to their lack of air radar and 
relatively small munitions, minesweepers are precluded from 
consideration for missile engagements with the PLA-N. 
Today's effective U.S. surface combatant force is 
153 ships.  
A max surge capability of two-thirds of all fleet 
forces is reasonable to assume due to persistent resupply, 
refitting, repair, and training demands. This results in 
approximately 100 surface combatants available for 
deployment at any given time. Of those 100, half will be 
dedicated to stability and security requirements of the 
Middle East and in home waters. Therefore, in this 
discussion it is approximated that the U.S. would likely 
have around 50 surface combatants available for engagements 
with the PRC. Composition of this fleet is estimated at:  
3-4 carriers, 7 cruisers, 20 destroyers, 9 frigates, 
1 littoral combat ship, and 10 amphibious ships.  
One might say that the fleet is expanding based 
upon procurement plans for Zumwalt class (DDG 1000) 
destroyer, America class (LHA-R) amphibious ship, San 
Antonio class (LPD-17) amphibious ship, Arleigh Burke 
destoryer (DDG-51), and Freedom/Independence class Littoral 
Combat Ship (LCS). However, their production numbers will 
                     
 
18 United States Navy, "U.S. Navy Active Ship Force Levels 1886-





roughly account for decommissioning rates in CGs,19 FFGs, 
and amphibious ships.20 Furthermore, Secretary of Defense 
Leon E. Panetta's testimony before the Senate Budget 
Committee regarding the $487B Department of Defense (DoD) 
budget cut declared ship production rates over the upcoming 
decade will fall below previous projections.21 
It is also understood that in the unfortunate 
event of actual hostilities in the SCS, the overall 
commander may decide to favor Aegis vessels over amphibious 
ones, and LCS may comprise more of the current FFG numbers. 
This does not change the general points which are rooted in 
the relative number of hulls the PLA-N must deny access to, 
and the problems associated with the high cost to the U.S. 
for building and maintaining that fleet. To the later area 
                     
 
19 "[T]he Navy's planned fleet of more than 300 ships includes, among 
other things, a requirement for maintaining a force of 88 cruisers and 
destroyers. The 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan submitted by 
the Navy in February 2010, in conjunction with the FY2011 budget, does 
not contain enough destroyers to maintain a force of 88 cruisers and 
destroyers consistently over the long run." U.S. Library of Congress, 
Congressional Research Service, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer 
Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, CRS 
Report RL32109 (Washington, DC: office of Congressional Information and 
Publishing, April 19, 2011), 5. 
20 Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta testified before the Senate 
Budget Committee that projected DoD budget cuts include decommissioning 
of ships ahead of schedule such as cruisers, "The Navy, while it will 
maintain and protect some of our highest priority and most flexible 
ships, it will retire seven lower priority Navy cruisers that have been 
—that have not been upgraded with ballistic missile defense 
capability." Senate Budget Committee: Opening Summary, Washington, DC: 
Capitol Hill, February 28th, 2012 (statement of Leon E. Panetta, 
Secretary of Defense). 
21 Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta notified the Senate Budget 
Committee, "At the same time, we recognize that we've got to be able to 
look at our modernization needs and make decisions about those that can 
be delayed. This budget identifies about $75 billion in savings 
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of concern, as $700M LCSs22 replace the $64M FFGs23  
($177M in 2012 dollars)24 the U.S. in fact expends more 
money without appreciable gain in the number of surface 
assets.  
The largest and most visible of all naval forces 
is the aircraft carrier whose ability to accomplish her  
mission in the face of harsh opposition is concerning. As a 
poignant article in the Autumn 2011 Naval War College 
Review declared: 
Currently, the 'airfield at sea' is almost the 
exclusive role for the large aircraft carrier, 
essentially fused with that of the 'geopolitical 
chess piece.' This [combined] role will continue 
to be highly useful into the future, so long as 
the intensity of defenses stays below a certain 
threshold. If either high-tech air or naval 
defenses proliferate, the number of areas and 
scenarios in which carriers can function in this 
role will decline. If this happens, the value of 
the carrier as a geopolitical chess piece will 
erode proportionately.25 
The SCS, teeming with robust, high-tech naval 
defenses, precludes the U.S. from confidently employing her 
carriers as an airfield at sea in a time of hostility. 
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Additionally, the role of the CVN as a political chess 
piece adds more significance to it should the PRC 
successfully "kill" one in the early stages of fighting. 
Such an attack would put a $10B hole in the USN  
($17B including aircraft)26 and fuel a massive wave of 
Chinese militaristic pride and further bolster their claim 
as a world power.  
The loss of $17B worth of fighting machines, the 
ensuing international embarrassment, and the political 
victories for the PRC provides ample reason for American 
commanders to greatly consider not risking CVNs in a 
hostile SCS. In these austere times of budget reductions, 
retarding ship production rates, and an expanding PLA-N, 
the U.S. Navy must find creative ways to multiply its 
effectiveness in the SCS.   
2. Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD): What the PRC is 
Expected to Bring to the Fight 
The present era of warfare at sea is defined by 
missile technology.27 In the missile era, the PRC casts a 
formidable shadow in the western Pacific with their current 
Air-to-Surface Missile (ASM) and Surface-to-Surface Missile 
(SSM) weapons systems. This technology has been pushed to 
the forefront of PRC interest in support of offshore 
defense.28 To understand the SCS as a potential battle space 
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is to understand how PRC missiles shape that landscape. As 
the 2011 Annual Report to Congress on PRC military 
developments announces: 
China's A2AD focus appears oriented toward 
restricting or controlling access to the land, 
sea, and air spaces along China's periphery, 
including the western Pacific. For example, 
China's current and projected force structure 
improvements will provide the PLA with systems 
that can engage adversary surface ships up to 
1,850 km [1,150 miles] from the PRC coast. These 
include: Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles: Medium 
Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) designed to 
target forces at sea, combined with overhead and 
over-the-horizon targeting systems to locate and 
track moving ships.29  
a. PRC Missile Overview 
The following PRC missile descriptions are 
provided in order to paint the SCS ASCM landscape at an 
unclassified level.  
(1)  Fu-Feng/JL-9 SS-N-22 "Sunburn" Anti-
Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM).  A 30 foot long SSM with a  
100-155 mile range weighing around 9,900 pounds (lbs). 
Sunburn is said to travel between mach 2.1 and 2.5. It is 
guided by an Inertial Navigation System (INS) with command 
course updates in the mid-course phase, and has 
active/passive radar for the terminal phase. Most 
critically, Sunburn is designed to make supersonic evasive 
maneuvers during the terminal phase in order to defeat the 
self-defense missile and gun systems of the Aegis weapons 
system. The size of the missile (nearly three times the 
                     
 




size of the U.S.' Tomahawk) in combination with its speed 
presents an incredible destructive force to its target on 
impact alone (in the scenario that an opponent ship 
neutralizes Sunburn's warhead and Sunburn still crashes 
into the target's hull). This missile system was purchased 
by the PRC in the late 1990s from Russia. The Sunburn is 
carried aboard destroyer class surface ships in the PLA-N.30  
(2)  Club/Caliber SS-N-27A "Sizzler" ASCM. 
SS-N-27A is a three stage SSM 27 feet in length, weighing 
around 4,200 lbs. Version A has INS with satellite mid-
course update capability and active terminal radar. Flight 
speed ranges between mach 0.55 to 0.80 for phases one and 
two. SS-N-27A has a phase three which begins 12 to 40 miles 
from the target in which a terminal vehicle separates from 
the delivery bus, drops to an elevation between 15 and 
30 feet above the sea surface, and proceeds towards the 
target at a speed of 2.2 Mach. The overall range of Sizzler 
A is approximately 135 miles and is deployable on surface 
and sub-surface assets in the PLA-N.31  
(3)  Club/Caliber SS-N-27B "Sizzler" ASCM. 
Version B differs from A by eliminating A's phase three 
(sprint phase towards the target) in exchange for increased 
range and improved warhead payload. It is suspected that an 
upgrade from INS to a Global Positioning System (GPS) is 
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included in version B as well. Sizzler B's range is an 
estimated 185 miles and deployable on surface and sub-
surface assets in the PLA-N.32 
(4)  Club/Caliber-K SS-N-27 3M54E "Sizzler" 
Canister Missile System (CMS) ASCM. Developed in 2010, 
4 Sizzler SSMs are packaged inside an International 
Organization for Standards (ISO) container box capable of 
launch from a merchant ship. It is unknown whether CMS 
contains version A or B of the SS-N-27.33  
(5)  DF-21D (CSS-5) ASCM. DF-21D is 35 feet 
in length, weighs 32,400 lbs, and is a two-stage SSM. 
Information Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) assets 
(satellites, submarines, fishing boats, et cetera) provide 
initial targeting information to DF-21D. A combination of 
INS and GPS give guidance to the missile during stage-one 
flight. The second-stage separates from the primary motor 
stage, and homes in on radar energy with an estimated 
Circular Error of Probability (CEP) of 65 feet. DF-21D is 
likely to be outfitted with a cluster flechette warhead 
designed to take out communications and radar equipment 
aboard ships as well as render carrier flight decks 
inoperable. Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP), High Explosive 
(HE), nuclear, and chemical warheads are potentially 
deployable on DF-21D as well. However, flechette offers the 
most politically attractive option for the ASCM purpose as 
it renders an opponent operational dead (soft-kill) with 
little chance to repair the carrier flight deck, while 
                     
 





minimizing loss of life. DF-21D has an expected range of 
960 miles and is predominantly employed from land based 
Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) vehicles.34 Figure 2 
shows a standard profile of a DF-21D missile flight.35 
 
Figure 2.   Profile for Land-Based ASCM Like DF-21D. From36 
(6) CSS-N-4 "Sardine" (YJ-8/YJ-82/C-801) 
ASCM. The C-801 is a 19-ft long, 14-inch diameter, solid 
state rocket propelled SSM. Sardine has a flight speed of 
0.9 Mach, and a range varying between 4.5 to 23 nm. The C-
801 delivery vehicle weighs 187 lbs, but packs a 364 lbs 
semi-armor-piercing warhead that terminal homes on target 
using a mono-pulse I-band seeker. Upon launch, C-801 climbs 
to 165 ft, guided by INS, but descends to roughly 80 ft as  
it actively seeks its target. Upon acquiring a target, 
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Sardine drops even further to approximately 20 ft above sea 
level on terminal flight.37  
(7) CSS-N-8 "Saccade" (YJ-83/C-802/YJ-83A/C-
802A) ASCM. The C-802 SSM is a turbojet propelled version 
of the C-801, extending the range of Saccade out to 97 nm.38  
(8) C-803 "Ghader" ASCM. The C-803 SSM 
improved the range of the C-802 extending it out to 108 nm. 
It was developed by the Iranian Aerospace Organization in 
Tehran and is suspected to make its way on newer Houbei 
class missile boats.39 
(9) C-602 (YJ-62) ASCM/Land Attack Missile. 
The C-602 is a 20-ft long, 21 inches in diameter, turbojet 
SSM. Traveling between 0.6 and 0.8 Mach, the YJ-62 has a 
max range of 151 nm and delivers a 660 lbs armor-piercing 
warhead. The C-602 cruises at 100 ft, but descends to about 
25 ft above the sea surface on terminal phase. This SSM is 
initial guided by INS, and contains active, frequency-
agile, mono-pulse terminal radar.40  
b. PRC Fleet Overview 
(1) Aircraft Carriers (CV). In 1998, the PRC 
purchased the unfinished aircraft carrier Varyag from the 
Ukranian government. In 2011 PLA-N conducted initial sea 
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trials of Varyag and returned her to dry dock for further 
refitting. DoD estimates that Varyag will enter full 
service as a ship only (no aircraft embarked) sometime in 
2012. U.S. government analysts further believe "a number of 
additional years" are necessary for competency levels to 
rise in order to facilitate an embarked air wing full 
time.41  
At full load Varyag is 65,000 tons, 
accommodating between 30-50 short-takeoff, vertical landing 
(STOVL) aircraft and helicopters. Presently, the PLA-N 
faces difficulties in obtaining arresting wire technology 
from Russia, which would enable conventional takeoff and 
landing (CTOL) of fixed winged aircraft.42 
The latest Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) report on Chinese naval activity expects two to three 
additional carriers will be built indigenously. Chinese 
government sources and photographic evidence suggest that 
two carriers are presently under construction at Changxing 
Island Shipyard in Shanghai. Those photographs reveal an 
overall length around 850 ft, with a beam approximately 220 
ft. Earliest commissioning date for these vessels is 
approximated at 2019-20.43 
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(2) Sovremenny Class Destroyer (DDGHM). PRC 
purchased four Sovremenny destroyers from Russia the first 
which entered PLA-N service in 1999, and the last in 2006.44 
A Sovremenny at full load is just over 8,000 tons and has 
an overall length of 511 ft, and a beam of 57 ft. Top speed 
is estimated at 32 knots (kts). At 14 kts a max range of  
4,000 nm is expected. The compliment is a crew of 300 with 
an additional 25 officers. Each Sovremenny is armed with 
8 SS-N-22 Sunburns.45  
(3) Indigenous Destroyer Classes: Luda (Type 
051), Luhu (Type 052), Luhai (051B), Luyang I (052B), 
Luyang II (052C), and Luzhou (051C).  
Four Luda (Type051) destroyers, built 
between 1971 and 1991, remain in PLA-N service today. Type 
051 displaces 3,800 tons at full load and has an overall 
length of 433 ft, and a 42 ft beam. Standard range is 
estimated at 3,000 nm at 18 kts, and carries a crew of 
280 with 45 officers. Luda is outfitted with A-band air 
search radar, and E/F-band surface search radar as well. 
The Luda destroyer is also equipped with 16 C-802 
missiles.46  
Two Luhu (Type 052) destroyers, commissioned 
between 1994 and 1996, are in the PLA-N fleet presently. 
Luhu destroyers are 472 ft in length and have a 53 ft beam. 
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At full load, the Luhu displaces 4,700 tons and carries 
38 officers and 266 crewmembers. A standard range of 
5,000 nm at a speed of 15 kts is estimated for this vessel. 
For radars, the Luhu has an A-band air search, G-band  
surface search, and an E/F-band air/surface search 
combination radar. Type 052 also carries 16 C-802 
missiles.47 
One Luhai (Type 051B) destroyer, the 
Shenzhen (DDGHM-167), remains in China's inventory. Her 
full displacement is 6,100 tons and is 505 ft long with a 
53 ft beam. Her top speed is estimated at 29 kts. Luhai's 
standard range is reported at 4,500 nm at 14 kts. She is 
complimented with a crew of 42 officers and 250 men. 
Shenzhen has two dedicated air search radars covering A and 
G bands. She is also outfitted with an E/F-band radar used 
for combination surface/air search. As with her sister 
destroyers, she comes outfitted with 16 C-802 missiles.48 
Two Luyang I (Type 052B) destroyers, both 
launched in 2002, are active in the PLA-N today. Luyang I 
is 7,100 tons at full load, stretching to 509 ft in length 
and 56 ft at the beam. Type 052B reaches an estimated top 
speed of 29 kts and has a nominal range of 4,500 nm at 
15 kts. She is replete with 40 officers and 280 enlisted. 
Her air search radar operates in the E/F-bands, and her 
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surface/air search radar covers the G-band. Luyang I 
destroyers are also armed with 16 C-802 missiles.49 
Presently, two Luyang II (Type 052C) 
destroyers are in service and another two are under 
construction with expected commissioning in 2013-2014. 
7,100 tons is Luyan II's full displacement. Her overall 
length is 509 ft, with a beam of 56 ft. The type 052C has a 
top speed of 29 kts, with a standard range of 4,500 nm at 
15 kts. Aboard are 40 officers and 280 crewmembers.50 
According to a recent CRS report, "The Luyang II-class 
ships appear to feature a phased-array radar that is 
outwardly somewhat similar to the SPY-1 radar used in the 
U.S. made Aegis combat system."51 Jane's Fighting Ships 
reports Luyang II possesses type 346 "Dragon Eye" phased 
array 3D air search/fire control radar covering A, G, and I 
bands. She is outfitted with only 8 C-602, and 8 HHQ-9 
self-defense, surface-to-air missiles (SAM).52 
Two Luzhou (Type 051C) destroyers are active 
in the Chinese Navy and were commissioned in 2006 and 2007. 
Type 051C has the same physical and manning characteristics 
of the Luhu, however the Luzhou is only equipped with 8 C-
802 missiles vice 16.53  
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(4) Frigate Classes: Jiangwei I (Type 053 
H2G), Jiangwei II (053H3), Jiangkai I (Type 054), and 
Jiangkai II (Type 054A). 
Jiangwei I and Jiangwei II share the general 
dimensions of: 2,300 tons, 367 ft in length, with a 41 ft 
beam. Both classes have a top speed estimated at 27 kts, 
with a standard 4,000 nm range at 18 kts. Additionally, 
both classes have a total compliment of 170. Presently the 
PLA-N employs four Type 053H2Gs all commissioned in the 
early 1990s. Each Jiangwei I carries 6 C-802 missiles. 
However, 10 Type 053H3s are active today and were 
commissioned in the late 1990s to mid-2000s. The Jiangwei 
II frigates carry 8 C-802 missiles each.54  
Slightly larger than the Jiangwei, the 
Jiangkai I and Jiangkai II have overall specifications of: 
3,600 tons, 440 ft in length, and 53 ft in the beam. Each 
type has an estimated top speed of 27 kts, with a nominal 
range of 3,800 nm at 18 kts. The crew is estimated at 
190 members. Only two Jiangkai I frigates are in the PLA-N 
inventory. They were commissioned in 2005 and 2006. 
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another six are under construction. The first Type 054A was 
commissioned in 2008. Both types of Jiangkai warships carry 
8 C-802 missiles.55  
(5) Corvette (Type 056). CRS reports several 
shipyards around the PRC are building the Type 056 
corvettes. Procurement numbers and ship building schedules 
are unknown at this time.56 However, Jane's estimates the 
PLA-N corvettes will displace between 1,000 to 1,800 tons 
and carry four C-802/803 missiles. It is anticipated that 
the Type 056 will replace the Houjian class (Type 037/2) 
fast-attack crafts (FAC).57  
(6) Houbei (Type 022) FAC. Current estimates 
project that 100 Houbei FAC are to be built by the PRC with 
83 already commissioned.58 The Type 022 is a sleek and 
stealthy catamaran that can do 40 plus kts. A crew of 
12 mans the 224 ton, 140 ft long by 40 ft wide missile 
boat. Each vessel carries 8 C-802 missiles packing the same 
firepower as the costlier and easier to spot PLA-N 
destroyers and frigates.59 Houbei confirms that the PRC has 
a firm grasp on the below concept: 
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[M]odern missiles have brought into question and 
sometimes overturned the principle of massing 
forces. A small naval vessel heavily armed with 
missiles in some tactical circumstances can take 




Figure 3.   Houbei Class (Type 022) FAC. From61 
(7) Amphibious Ships. PRC intends to build 
two classes of amphibious ships, both capable of operating 
helicopters, which in turn could potentially strike surface 
ships. One Yuzhao class (Type 071), a 17,000 ton amphibious 
vessel, was commissioned in 2008. Two additional Type 071 
hulls are under construction or awaiting sea trials.62  
Additionally, it is suspected that the PRC 
intends to construct a 20,000 ton Type 081 amphibious 
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vessel. Such a large warship is estimated to have 
significant air capabilities along the lines of a 
helicopter carrier. The CRS report believes all together 
three Type 081 ships will be built.63  
Table 1 summarizes the number of principle 
surface combatants in the PLA-N fleet both present and 
projected. 
Number and Types of PLA-N Surface Combatants 
 Present Projected 
Aircraft Carrier 1 3 
Sovremenny 4 4 
Destroyer (Type 051/052) 13 15 
Frigate (Type 053/054) 26 32 
FAC (Type 022) 83 100 
Amphibious (Type 071/081) 1 6 
Total Surface Combatants 128 160 
Table 1.   Number and Types of PLA-N Surface Combatants 
A summation of ASCM carried by PLA-N surface 
combatants is presented in Table 2. 
PLA-N ASCM Fleet Totals by Ship Class 
 Present Projected 
Sovremenny 32 32 
Destroyer (Type 051/052) 176 192 
Frigate (Type 053/054) 200 248 
FAC (Type 022) 664 800 
Total ASCMs 1072 1272 
Table 2.   PLA-N ASCM Fleet Totals by Ship Class 
Applying the two-thirds rule of ship 
availability to the PLA-N, the composition of their ships 
                     
 




available for a potential SCS conflict (present day) is: 
1 carrier, 2 Aegis type destroyers, 9 destroyers, 
17 missile frigates, 1 amphibious vessel, and 55 missile 
FAC.  
Table 3 shows the probable compositions of USN and 
PLA-N present day forces in the event of conflict in the 
SCS. 
Probable Composition of USN & PLA-N Surface 
Combatants (Present Day) 
 USN PLA-N 
Aircraft Carrier w/Air Wing 3-4 0 
Aircraft Carrier no Air Wing 0 1 
Aegis Style Cruiser/Destroyer 27 2 
Missile Destroyer/Frigate 0 26 
Frigate/LCS no Missiles 10 0 
Amphibious w/Helicopters 10 1 
FAC w/Missiles 0 55 
Total Surface Combatants 50-51 85 
Table 3.   Probable Composition of USN & PLA-N Surface 
Combatants (Present Day) 
B. UNDERSTANDING NAVAL MISSILE WARFARE THROUGH 
MATHEMATICAL MODELING 
Whether it is a few ships in a naval skirmish, or an 
entire fleet versus fleet engagement, the following model 
is applicable to all scales of naval missile warfare. 
1. Salvo Model of Modern Missile Combat64 
In preparing a cogent way to peel back the layers of 
PRC A2AD, it is important to understand the maxim of SUW: 
                     
 




launch the first effective strike.65 Captain Wayne P. 
Hughes, Jr., United States Navy (USN) (retired), in his 
seminal work Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat examines the 
probable outcomes of two fleets engaged in missile warfare. 
Expanding upon the Lanchester Equation, Hughes develops the 
following equation modeling fleet missile combat:66 
∆B = (σaαA—b3B) ÷ (b1) 
Is the effect of fleet A's missile salvo on fleet B. 
∆A = (σbβB—a3A) ÷ (a1) 
Is the effect of fleet B's missile salvo on fleet A. 
In the above equations, a1 and b1 represent the 
"staying power" of that lettered fleet and is considered 
the number of missiles required to put a single ship out of 
action.67 Characters α and β represent the "striking power" 
of each attacking fleet denoting the number of missiles 
that will hit opposition if there is no defense.68 Symbols 
a3 and b3 represent "defensive power" which is the number of 
missiles a defender will successfully deflect or defend 
against when poised to receive attack.69 Subsequently, 
"survivability" is derived from combining defensive power 
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and staying power.70 Additionally, scouting and range 
factors are represented by σ which scales from zero to one 
based upon a fleet's ability to not only detect/target the 
enemy but also find themselves within firing range.71 In 
applying these equations Hughes derives Table 4 regarding 
first strike survivors. 
 Initial Number of Missile Ships (A/B) 
2/2 3/2 2/1 3/1 4/1 
A attacks 1st 2/0 3/0 2/0 3/0 4/0 
B attacks 1st 0/2 0/2 0/1 0/1 1/1 
A and B strike 
together 
0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 
Table 4.   First Strike Survivors (A/B). From72 
As the numbers demonstrate, strike effectively first 
is the supreme tenant of naval missile engagement. It is 
important to note especially the outcome of "B attacks 1st" 
when fleet "A" has a 4/1 advantage over fleet "B." The 
equation resolves to show a 1/1 force distribution whose 
subsequent outcomes are then determined by examining row 
"2/2." Again, from row "2/2" the ultimate victor is the 
fleet who can effectively strike first in the second 
volley. It is important to note that the 4/1 ratio is a 
tipping point where the smaller fleet faces great odds at  
effectively striking first because his numerical 
inferiority leaves too many ships with the ability to 
counterstrike in fleet "A."   
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When considering the U.S. Navy's role in the SCS, one 
realizes that in an effort to maintain moral superiority 
the American fleet will not "pull the trigger" and 
therefore is subject to the PRC fleet's advantage of firing 
first. This puts American forces behind the naval missile 
maxim. Knowing this, the key to success in the SCS is to 
render the PRC's first strike ineffective opening the door 
to an effective U.S. counterpunch.  
To maintain a viable American fleet available for a 
returned missile volley, one realizes that the size of the 
U.S. forces in the SCS must meet or exceed four times that 
of the PLA-N. That, or scouting effectiveness of American 
ships must increase. Or, defensive power against PRC 
missiles must increase. Or most advantageous, a combination 
of all three previous factors, which in chorus provides the 
U.S. surface forces an effective opportunity to return 
fire. Additionally, by improving several facets of this 
model in favor of the U.S., the PRC must divide strategic 
thinking in order to overcome layers of American staying 
power.  
C. THE NEW NAVY FIGHTING MACHINE 
Captain Hughes specifically addresses how the USN can 
increase overall fleet numbers while maintaining present 
SCN budgets in his paper, "The New Navy Fighting Machine: A 








Strategy, Sea Power, Naval Operations, and Composition of 
the United States Fleet."73 The following will highlight 
elements of his findings. 
1. Historical Similarities and Rationale 
In examining naval activities of capital ships in the 
Russo-Japanese war, and World War I, one can see the that 
the battleship was pushed farther away from operations in 
coastal waters as the threat of mines and submarines became 
more prolific.74  
In a similar manner, if fighting were to break out in 
the SCS, the threat of DF-21 and the widespread employment 
of ASCM amongst PLA-N assets potentially push the carrier 
to operate at distances greater than 1,150 nm from the PRC 
coast.75 Already the concerns over what the loss of a 
carrier means in terms of both finances and PRC pride have 
been discussed.76 But to some extent, those principles are 
not entirely forgone when considering the American Aegis 
assets. It is understood the world over that an Aegis  
warship is the preeminent fighting vessel. The cost of that 
functionality comes at $2B per warship, arguably making her 
another prized trophy.77   
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In reviewing the Falkland War, one of the few examples 
of naval missile warfare, it is evident that even the most 
capable ships can be caught unaware by a missile strike. 
Such was the case with the HMS Sheffield, which was sunk on 
May 4, 1982, because she was not alert.78 Believing a 
similar fate will not befall a U.S. DDG or CG is perhaps 
too optimistic—especially considering that the PRC has the 
element of surprise in firing the first shot. As Hughes 
soundly notes: 
A special concern for inshore warfare is a 
greater risk of catching a single ship napping 
because of the cluttered environment and the 
reduced battle space. I have yet to find a 
rationale for sending large, expensive, and 
highly capable warships into contested coastal 
waters unless they can take several hits and 
continue fighting without missing a beat after 
suffering a first attack by the enemy. It is 
better to fight fire with fire using expendable, 
missile-carrying aircraft or small surface  
craft. In fact, ever since the introduction of 
numerous torpedo boats, coastal submarines, and 
minefields... contested coastal waters have been  
taboo for capital ships and the nearly exclusive 
province of flotillas of small, swift, lethal 
fast-attack craft.79 
It is staggering to consider the sheer number of 
Sunburn, Sizzler, DF-21, C-801/2/3, C-601, and various ASMs 
a U.S. Aegis ship must defend against in the SCS. Further 
consider the factor that doctrine normally requires 
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multiple shots at a single incoming missile. Historically 
speaking, maritime missile attacks at an alert target 
capable of defending itself, has a 32% success rate.80 An 
American fleet engaged in a firefight in the SCS will face 
leakers, and there is a strong likelihood that several 
valuable surface vessels will be sent to the deep.  
In the SCS scenario under consideration, the American 
fleet continues to build strategy based predominantly upon 
CVNs, CG/DDGS, FFG/LCS, and amphibious ships. However, as 
has been shown, the PLA-N is building intermediary levels 
of warships, dividing their mission areas into focused 
fields, while distributing their firepower.81 All of this 
makes for neutralization of their offensive forces 
exceedingly difficult. It is the recommendation of this 
thesis that the USN in turn develops a more distributed 
force posture so as to improve the U.S. fleet's staying 
power and tactical prowess in the SCS.  
Present-day Ship Construction Navy (SCN) is committed 
to replacing once technologically advanced, but now 
deteriorating U.S. warships with the latest, state of the 
art war machines on a general one-for-one basis.82 However, 
the supreme investment of constructing the latest gadget 
filled vessel comes at the expense of growing the overall 
number of ships in the fleet. It is possible to see this 
procurement strategy as meticulously planned stagnation.   
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A research paper from the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) titled the "The New Navy Fighting Machine" addresses 
how, without expanding the SCN budgets, the American fleet 
can increase both the number of ships and warfare areas. 
The driving ethos behind NNFM is summed as:  
Imagine now a strategical system... so that the 
navy will resemble a vast and efficient organism, 
all parts leagued together by common 
understanding and a common purpose; mutually 
dependent, mutually assisting, sympathetically 
obedient to the controlling mind that directs 
them toward 'the end in view.' 
In this manner, the NNFM moves away from the self-
contained, all in one concept that has pushed U.S. surface 
ships to the high extremes of technology and cost, which 
has made them so unaffordable to lose in battle. Instead, 
NNFM looks to restore the lessons found in PT boats,  
British MGB and MTB, light cruisers, corvettes, destroyer 
tenders, and so on—building affordable ships with focused 
purpose.83  
2. Composition of the New Navy Fighting Machine 
a. The NNFM Green Water Fleet 
A U.S. fleet composition predicated upon the NNFM 
would offer significant assistance in the SCS. Chiefly, 
NNFM calls for the creation of a Green Water Theater 
Security and Coastal Combat fleet component at 10% of the 
Navy's SCN budgets.84 The intent of the "Green Water Navy" 
is to beat back the clutter of defenses in the SCS opening 
                     
 





a battle-lane from which the Blue Water Navy can 
confidently operate inward from. Table 5 lists the elements 
of NNFM Green Water Fleet.85 
NNFM Green Water Fleet 
Ship or Craft Number of Units 
Coastal Combatant 30 
Offshore Patrol 160 
Fleet Station Ship 12 
Inshore Patrol 400 
Gunfire Support 12 
Fast Mine Warfare (MIW) 12 
Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) Ship 12 
CVL (Green Water Fleet) 8 
Coastal Combatant Tender 2 
Total 648 
Table 5.   NNFM Green Water Fleet. From86 
The primary missile shooter in the NNFM's Green 
Water Fleet is theorized to be a new coastal combatant. For 
the coastal combatant this thesis will adopt the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) prototype SeaLance: a 500 ton, 
wave-piercing catamaran carrying four Harpoon SSMs, and 
51 short-range dual-purpose SAMs/SSMs. Crew size of 
SeaLance is 12 with berthing aboard for 25 to facilitate 
SEALs, Marine Boat Unit, or staff movement. The design 
purpose of the SeaLance fleet is to go into harm's way to 
engage the enemy, accept losses, so as to better protect 
Blue Water assets and troop transports. Along these lines, 
SeaLance is expected to draw fire, take hits, and 
subsequently go down. The crews will not conduct extensive 
                     
 





damage control (DC) efforts, and they will take to life 
rafts for collection by other USN forces.87  
Offshore Patrol Craft are modeled after the U.S. 
Coast Guard (USCG) Sentinel class Fast Response Cutter 
(FRC). They will not be principal missile combatants, nor 
support helicopter operations. However, their main 
contributions will come in conducting maritime interdiction 
operations (MIO), and command, control, communications, 
computers, information, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(C4ISR) in international sea-lanes and access points 
leading to the SCS.88  
Small conventional carriers (CVL) will displace 
25,000 to 30,000 tons and support an air wing of 20 F-35B 
STOVL fighter-attack aircraft. Additionally, unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs) are potentially deployable on the 
CVL.89  
The Gunfire Support ship is truly a single 
purpose vessel equipped with an Advanced Gun System (AGS), 
Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSM), and countermine 
subsurface search capability. The displacement is based 
upon satisfactorily supporting the weapons and crew. Beyond 
that, if it is not associated with the AGS, ESSM, crew 
support, or safety of navigation it will not go on the 
Gunfire Support ship. Otherwise, this small warship is  
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intended to transit to the firing line at emissions control 
(EMCON) alpha (no emissions), strike at land based targets, 
and scoot.90 
b. The NNFM Blue Water Fleet 
The U.S. fleet of today is predominantly geared 
for open ocean operations. Furthermore, it finds itself 
having more highly advanced missile ships (CG/DDG) in 
proportion to other open water assets such as simple 
destroyers, frigates, and corvettes. No other fleet in the 
world is so top heavy.91 The sheer resources it takes to 
finance these advance missile ships drain the resources 
available for overall variations of the blue water warships 
the U.S. makes. The NNFM proposes a more balanced force 
structure composed of the ships in table 6 at 80%92 of the 
current SCN budgets. 
 
NNFM Blue Water Fleet 
Ship or Craft Number of Units 
CVN 6 
CVL (Blue Water Fleet) 10 
Land Attack 20 
DDG/DDGX 30 
Missile Frigates 90 
Total 156 
Table 6.   NNFM Blue Water Fleet. From93 
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The two proposed new ship designs in the NNFM 
Blue Water fleet are the Land Attack ships, and the 
Frigates. The NNFM Frigate lends a significant contribution 
to U.S. fleet efforts in the SCS.  
Outfitted with eight long-range SSMs, the Frigate 
adds firepower in the corner of the USN offsetting a great 
deal of the offensive capability of the PLA-N Houbei FAC. 
Not acting simply as a missile boat, the NNFM Frigate is 
also equipped with an ASW suite, a helicopter or UAVs, and 
short-range hard/soft kill defenses.94  
The Land Attack ship is a single purpose, 
austere, corvette sized vessel. This corvette is equipped 
with 50 Tomahawk-like missiles and can operate with battle 
groups or perhaps disperse from the surface action group 
(SAG) as prevailing tactics see fit. Such a design not only  
distributes the firepower amongst several hulls, it also 
has the multiplying effect of creating more targets that 
the PLA-N must address.95 
3. Numbers Comparison between NNFM, Current U.S. 
Fleet, and PLA-N 
The same two-thirds ship availability and operational 
commitments in the Middle East apply to the NNFM. However, 
a benefit of having ships with highly focused skill sets is 
their distinct application to problems. As NNFM carrier 
battle groups continue to rotate through the Persian Gulf, 
it is reasonable to assume they will not have need of the 
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Green Water Fleet unless fighting is imminent. This 
facilitates Green Water Fleet resource dedication in the 
SCS. Therefore, the NNFM SCS contingent is comprised of: 20 
SeaLances, 106 Offshore Patrol ships, 8 Gunfire Support 
ships, 8 ASW ships, 5 CVLs (Green Water), 2 CVNs, 3 CVLs 
(Blue Water), 7 Land Attack, 10 DDGs, and 30 missile 
Frigates. Table 7 shows the breakdown across today's USN 
fleet, today's PLA-N fleet, proposed NNFM fleet, and 
projected PLA-N fleet available for action in the SCS.   
 
Probable Composition of USN, PLA-N, NNFM, & Projected PLA-N Surface 
Combatants 
 USN PLA-N NNFM Projected 
PLA-N 
CVN  3-4 0 2 0 
CV/CVL 0 1 8 2 
Aegis Style Cruiser/Destroyer 27 1 10 2 
Missile Destroyer/Frigate 0 27 30 29 
Combatants w/no SSM 10 0 129 0 
Amphibious 10 1 8 4 
FAC 0 55 20 67 
Total Surface Combatants 50-51 85 207 104 
Table 7.   Probable Composition of USN, PLA-N, NNFM, and 
Projected PLA-N Surface Combatants 
4. Conclusions 
In strengthening treaties and by upholding 
international law, the U.S. has critical reason to police 
the SCS. Such actions might draw attack from the PRC who 
may view a U.S. presence as threatening. As Hughes 
masterfully derived, the pinnacle of modern naval warfare 
is delivering the first effective strike. U.S. fleet forces 
are likely restricted by Rules of Engagement (ROE) 




When comparing U.S. surface navy numbers with the PLA-N, it 
is clear that American combatants are at a formidable 
disadvantage. The Hughes' missile equation reveals how 
increasing fleet numbers, increasing staying power, and 
improving scouting/targeting aid the American surface 
combatants greatly. The NNFM study articulates how fleet 
expansion is possible, even at present SCN budgeting, 
redoubling American preparedness in the SCS. Improving 
staying power, scouting, and targeting in the NNFM, further 
empowering the USN fleet to deliver that crucial 







II. COUNTER TARGETING IN THE NNFM 
A. PRINCIPLES OF COUNTER-TARGETING (CT) 
Captain Jeff E. Kline, USN (ret.), in his paper 
"Exploring Effects of Counter-Targeting in Naval Warfare" 
adapts the Hughes' missile equation to approximate the 
value of CT amongst surface combatants. He writes: 
To understand the effects of degrading the 
attacking force's scouting effectiveness, or 
targeting ability before launching an attacking 
missile, we degrade the parameter of σ of the 
attacking force. In our case, the scouting 
effectiveness parameter represents the attacking 
force's ability to target prior to missile 
launch, with σ = 1 being perfect targeting 
capability and σ = 0 meaning the attacking force 
lost all ability to target.96 
To figure out what factor in targeting, σ, must be 
accounted for if a numerically inferior fleet were to 
achieve parity with the numerically superior fleet, Kline's 
model begins with fleet "A" numbering m times that of fleet 
"B":97 
A = mB 
From there, if the other factors of striking power and 
survivability are set as equal, it is determined that:98 
σa = σb / m2 
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Or more directly put, fleet "B" must reduce the 
targeting ability of fleet "A" by a factor of the inverse 
square of the magnitude of fleet "A". To illustrate, if "A" 
were twice as numerous as "B", A = 2B, then m = 2 and σa = 
σb / 22 in order for "B" to reach parity with "A". In this 
example, for fleet "B" to achieve parity with fleet "A" it 
would have to reduce the targeting ability of "A", σa, to 
1/4 the ability at which fleet "B" can target.99  
Kline admits these calculations are theoretical.100 
However, to add some weight behind the mathematics, he 
employs a stochastic computer model to simulate surface 
combat between the two fleets with "A" set at twice the 
size of "B". In the model, to account for degradation to σa 
Kline increases the ability for "B" to go undetected which 
the computer considers "camouflage factor." As "B's" 
camouflage factor increased, "A's" targeting factor σa 
decreased proportionally. Figure 4 shows the results of 
running 30 mock battles between "A" and "B" with m = 2, and 
σa set at 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9, and 0.99 by means of "B's" 
camouflage factor. 
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Figure 4.   Less Numerous Force Achieves Parity by  
Countering the Larger Fleet's Targeting. From101 
As shown in the modeling results, "B" begins to 
achieve parity at the theoretical σa of 0.25 seen at 
camouflage factor 0.75. Even though Kline titles his 
results, "Less Numerous Forces Achieve Parity through 
Lowering Radar Cross Section and Jamming" it is important 
to remember that any means of lowering an opponent's 
targeting factor, or increasing one's own scouting factor 
will achieve similar results. 
A critical voice may offer that degrading an opponent 
fleet's targeting ability by factors as large as 75% may be 
                     
 




fiscally or feasibly impractical.102 However, Kline's 
modeling demonstrates that disadvantages in fleet numbers 
can theoretically be made up via scouting, CT, or a 
combination of both. Furthermore, an attempt to regain 
parity, or improve past parity, need not be made in a 
single leap. CT comes in a variety of methods: 
[D]eception, electronic jamming, decoys, 
electromagnetic emission control, building ships 
with low radar cross section [RCS], reducing 
acoustic signatures, use of weather to mask ship 
movements and other information warfare 
techniques.103  
It is urged by the authors that several avenues of CT 
and scouting come together in the combined effect of 
reducing the σ factor of the PLA-N fleet. 
In specifically examining the PLA-N and the USN in the 
SCS, it is important to consider how the presently planned 
USN fleet and the NNFM fleet compare to the projected PLA-
N. If the planned American fleet where to face the 
projected PLA-N, the Chinese would have a magnitude 
advantage m of 2.08.104 Today's Navy would have to degrade 
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China's targeting to 23%105 that of the USN's targeting 
capability to overcome inferior numbers.106 The NNFM however 
would cut the magnitude edge of the projected PLA-N down to 
an m of 1.34 resulting in reduction of the PLA-N σ down to 
a more manageable 56% that of the American fleet.107  
In addition, it is important to note that the NNFM 
would have 129 Patrol Craft intermixed with their primary 
combatant force of 78 missile platforms. To a PLA-N ASCM, 
these Patrol Craft are just as viable targets as other 
moderate displacement surface craft. The inclusion of 
Patrol Crafts in the NNFM fleet has the added advantage of 
doubling as CT decoys effectively reducing the σ of the 
PLA-N. No similar advantage exists in the modern American 
fleet.  
This thesis will continue to address means by which CT 
could be accomplished.  
B. USV AS ASCM CT ASSET 
The root principles of naval missile warfare discussed 
so far have been strike effectively first, force ratio of 
missile shooters greatly effects the outcome, and 
CT/scouting adjustments can alter the effectiveness of an 
opposing fleet. The NNFM study articulates ways to increase 
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fleet missile shooter numbers. However, the first strike 
and CT factors are greatly enhanced with the inclusion of 
USVs in any version of the American fleet. 
Picture the PLA-N and USN forces divided by 50 nm of 
open-ocean under heated tension in the SCS. The decision 
has been made on the PRC side to initiate hostilities and 
so the first wave of C-802s rocket off the decks of the 
PLA-N FACs, frigates, and destroyers. As the C-802s break 
the horizon and catch first glimpses of the American fleet, 
they lock onto the radar cross sections (RCS) their I-band, 
active seekers detect. Dropping down to 20 ft above the 
wave tops the first pulse makes a terminal run at their 
targets. One-half to two-thirds of the PLA-N missiles 
succumb to hard and soft kill U.S. defenses.108 For the 
roughly one-third of the remaining missiles they strike 
home. The successful C-802s begin detonating their 364 lbs 
warheads in the ribs of the USN hulls. The unfortunate case 
for these missiles is that they homed in on the large 
number of USVs intermixed amongst the American naval 
assets. The USN missile shooters are left in force and 
ready to launch the first effective strike by means of a 
counterpunch.  
What is stunning about the above scenario is it is by 
no means out of grasp. Wireless vehicle command technology 
is developed and continues refinement in a myriad of 
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programs ranging from air, surfaces, and even subsurface 
vehicles.109 The Sea Fox and the Common USV (CUSV) already 
demonstrate the ability to augment surface forces remotely 
and fiscally.110  
The USV can adapt to a spectrum of uses, however it is 
highly encouraged that all fleet USVs include CT capability 
(adding to the number of valid surface targets an enemy 
missile will home on), and facilitate more robust fleet 
EMCON procedures. 
In examining both the PLA-N fleet of today and their 
projected fleet, the predominant SSM is by far the C-802. 
Understanding that the Sovremenny class is the only PLA-N 
surface vessel known to carry the SS-N-22 Sunburn, all 
other potential surface opponents fire the Saccade.111 This 
makes the PLA-N present day SSM inventory 32 Sunburns, and  
1,040 C-802 Saccades.112 The projected PLA-N forces are 
similarly Saccade centric with 32 Sunburns, and 1,240 C-
802s anticipated.113 
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Again, it is known that the PRC has tactical air 
(TacAir) assets, and a potent submarine force that deliver 
some of the more dangerous Russian derivative missiles. It 
is the purview of this thesis to examine ways in which the 
USN surface assets regain dominance over a threatening PLA-
N surface force, and understands that American subsurface 
and air components are expected to similarly find dominance 
in their domains as well. 
Employing a combination of INS and an active I-band 
seeker, the C-802 relies upon reflected radar energy at a 
predetermined range from their launch point in targeting. 
This method of targeting is not highly discriminatory as 
exemplified by the C-802 that slammed into a Cambodian 
flagged freighter intended instead for Israeli Naval Ship 
Spear in July of 2006.114  
Knowing that the RCS is the critical factor in 
countering the C-802 missile, one can see in figure 5 that 
general RCS profiles of ships ranging from several hundred 
tons to 35,000 tons overlap in the 10 meters (m) squared 
range. This wide area of overlap provides a tactical window 
in which USVs can offer Saccade cover for American 
warships. 
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Figure 5.   General RCS Profiles of Ships by Tonnage. From115 
Exploiting RCS is achievable by two general methods. 
The first method is to adjust the RCS of a USV so it looks 
larger and therefore more likely to attract the incoming 
ASCM. The second method is for the covered warship to 
minimize its profile by means of maneuvering relative to 
inbound ASCM thereby minimizing her own RCS.  
In the first method, a USV can artificially have her 
RCS increased so as to best adjust to the ships she is 
providing CT for. From design, a fleet USV ought to have an 
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innate RCS similar to the smaller surface combatants 
expected in USN inventory. In the NNFM this would be the 
SeaLance and Patrol Craft. In the current USN fleet it 
would be the LCS. From this elemental RCS profile, adding 
radar reflectivity would be scaled in accordance to the SAG 
composition. For example, if a SAG contained Aegis assets, 
the CT USV is adjusted so as to have a similar RCS. 
However, if the SAG is composed of LCS, or SeaLance, then 
the USV radar reflectivity is not adjusted.  
Increasing the RCS of objects is a sound principle 
well known to the mariner who relies upon radar reflective 
shapes located on navigational buoys. Affixing similar 
objects to a USV to range in RCS profiles is therefore no 
technological stretch and is achievable even by crews at 
sea affixing prescribed radar reflectors in a predetermined 
configuration. This is especially attractive in the sense 
that much effort has been spent reducing the RCS of 
warships, which is exceedingly difficult and costly. Here, 
one wants to do the implicitly simple: allow the radio 
energy to return to the ASCM seeker.   
Tactically speaking, the SAG can create a CT USV 
buffer (see Figure 6). This tactic identifies the high 
value unit (HVU) and establishes an RCS on the USV similar 
to the HVU.116 The screen commander then establishes the 
buffer by placing the USVs in the surface screen down the 
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threat vector from the HVU. The intention of placing the 
USVs in this fashion is for the wave of ASCMs to lock onto 
the first set of targets encountered in the surface group's 
vicinity thereby leaving a fewer number of ASCMs available 
to transit further onto the SAG.  
 
Figure 6.   CT USV Buffer Tactic 
The buffer tactic is seen in today's SUW forces with 
the unfavorable tradeoff of sacrificing both offensive 
power and lives for an increase in defensive power of the 
HVU. A flotilla of CT USVs offers a true "missile sponge"117 
in the SAG screen allowing the commander to maximize 
firepower retention while raising the defensive power of 
all combatants in the screen.  
Once it is determined that ASCMs are inbound on the 
SAG, the missile combatants should further complicate the 
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opponent's missile targeting by minimizing their own RCS 
profiles (see Figure 7). For example, if the port or 
starboard quarter is the least radar reflective profile, 
the SAG should proceed in a direction relative to the 
inbound missiles to which the ASCM seekers are presented 
the quarter aspects of the SAG combatants. This leaves the 
CT USV buffers exposed and attractive to the ASCMs.  
 
Figure 7.   CT USV Buffer Tactic with SAG Minimizing RCS 
Profile 
Incorporating a ship-counter on the ASCM potentially 
defeats the buffer tactic. A ship-counter would simply 
direct the ASCM to home in on say the third target it deems 
valid. This would cause an increased number of inbound 
ASCMs to bypass buffers, picket lines, or outer rings of 
the SAG screen. Inverting the buffer tactic by placing the 
HVU closest to the threat can have serious subsurface 






across the surface screen would negate further ASCM 
developments aimed at exploiting SAG geometry as shown in 
Figure 8.  
 
Figure 8.   CT USV Disbursement Amongst Combatants Tactic 
Should the PRC develop ship-counter technology and 
implement them on their ASCMs, their reliance on RCS based 
targeting is tremendously confounded by the disbursed 
presence of USVs. Also, even disbursement presents nearly 
identical SAG screen geometry no matter the approach vector 
of the ASCM. This removes any advantage the PLA-N might 
seek in providing waypoints to ASCMs en route to American 
surface groups intending to bypass CT measures.  
It is hard to predict what exactness future 




known that the PLA-N SSM ASCM inventory is at least 97%118 
C-802. The "C" series of missiles, with targeting 
technology founded upon radar principles of the 1980s, is 
susceptible to CT. Should every missile combatant in the 
SAG have a counterpart USV, reasoning has it that half of 
every PLA-N RCS based ASCM will go after the USV decoy. CT 
USVs potentially cut the PLA-N surface force striking power 
in half.  
A further implication of employing USVs for CT is 
forcing the PRC to develop new and complicated methods of 
targeting. The principle paths for PRC development in these 
areas are refined RCS homing so as to keep the "C" missiles 
viable, to which the U.S. can further refine counter RCS 
tactics making this route a hard game for the PRC to 
pursue. The other clear route for PRC targeting is to 
develop anti-radiation missile (ARM) seekers. Later in this 
chapter the USV as an EMCON and CT ARM platform will be 
examined. 
As it stands, the implications of CT USV have not been 
addressed by overarching USN USV vision. According to "The 
Navy Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) Master Plan" a fleet 
USV is actively under development that will provide mine 
countermeasures (MCM), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), 
surface warfare (SUW), special operations forces (SOF) 
support, electronic warfare (EW), and maritime interdiction 
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operations (MIO).119 Of course USVs with such a wide 
spectrum of warfare missions could potentially assist the 
maritime commander greatly. However, as America's focus 
draws upon the SCS it is important that the crucial 
elements needed for the USN fleet to gain tactical 
advantage be identified and delivered. No CT USV role is 
articulated under the USV master plan. As discussed above, 
there is clearly a need for CT amongst SUW forces in the 
missile environment of the SCS and any USV that is 
delivered to the American fleet must fundamentally fulfill 
this mission above all others.  
C. USV AS SURFACE EMISSIONS ASSET 
1. Example of Low Probability Detection Interception 
(LPDI) DoD Technology 
The U.S. Air Force (USAF) Fast Airborne Laser 
Communications Optical Node (FALCON) laser network research 
program has yielded notable success in turning optics based 
data paths into viable, high bandwidth lines of 
communication. A white paper titled "Observations of 
Atmospheric Effects for FALCON laser Communication System 
Flight Test" summarizes the breakthrough 2010 experiment. 
In this experiment a combination of DC-3 and DHC-6 
airplanes flew at unpublished altitudes banking, turning, 
changing elevation, and altering distances from each other 
all while maintaining an optical laser data path (see 
Figure 9).120 Even separated at 80 miles (mi), FALCON laser 
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communications maintained a 2.5 gigabit-per-second (Gbps) 
link for several hours. At the time of the experiment, two 
operational FALCON transceivers had been made at a data 
rate of 2.5 and 10 Gbps, respectively. The FALCON project 
team expects as more transceivers are produced at the 
higher data rates that 10 Gbps of throughput are 
achievable.121  
 
Figure 9.   FALCON Laser Node Affixed to DC-3 Aircraft. 
From122 
The idea of using lasers to create optical, high rate, 
LPDI networks has existed for over 30 years.123 The primary 
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factor preventing laser optic networks has been atmospheric 
scintillation characterized as beam movement and beam 
blur.124  
The laser produced by the FALCON transceivers overcome 
atmospheric blur by incorporating a collimator and axicom 
to produce a Bessel beam. A Bessel beam is non-diffractive, 
and self-healing. Bit error correction on the receiver side 
of the transceiver further reduces the effects of optical 
blur.125  
To overcome beam movement, the FALCON team created a 
dynamic optical tracking system based upon a Fast Steering 
Mirror (FSM). A wide field of view beam keeps the FSM in 
sight with the corresponding FALCON transceiver, while a 
narrow beam is used for actual data transmission. Real time 
analysis of errors from the data signal produces an 
aggregate atmospheric wave-front tilt used to correct the 
FSM angle in order to center on the beam axis. In this 
manner, FALCON has successfully managed the complications 
of optical transmission in a heterogeneous atmosphere.126  
Even though FALCON laser paths have successfully 
demonstrated ground-to-ground, air-to-ground, and air-to-
air links, two factors arise in applying this technology to 
naval use. Firstly, offsetting the pitch and roll of a ship 
at sea in order to provide a stable platform is unproven 
and potentially disruptive to the optical pathway. 
                     
 






Secondly, an encasement for FALCON transceivers that do not 
foul under maritime conditions (e.g., salt buildup) are not 
yet developed. Despite these practical and valid concerns 
regarding naval application of optical data paths, it is 
encouraging to note the conclusions of the FALCON white 
paper:  
[The successful demonstration] shows that laser 
communication is a viable communication option 
for operational consideration. The operational 
utility of systems such as FALCON must now be 
investigated as the performance of these systems 
continue to improve.127 
Again, this thesis points to FALCON as an example of a 
highly capable and developing LPDI communications path. As 
will be seen, the edge gained from LPDI paths should 
encourage USN involvement in leveraging such a powerful 
tool for maritime application. 
2. USVs at EMCON 
Knowing that the USV can provide CT cover from RCS 
seeker based ASCMs for USN surface combatants, it is time 
to exploit the EMCON potentials of the USV. 
Triangulating a SAG's location by means of detecting 
their electro-magnetic (EM) emissions is a well understood 
technique of modern warfare. A traditional counter, known 
as EMCON alpha, is for the SAG commander to order ships in 
company to stop emitting EM energy. The EMCON alpha tactic  
 
 
                     
 




will continue to be a vital card in the SAG commander's 
hand, however there are some modifications that might prove 
useful.  
Having USVs outfitted with legacy radio frequency (RF) 
communications gear128 and LPDI "tethers" (linking warship 
and USV without emitting EM energy) the SAG commander can 
spoof his surface group's location. To achieve the spoof, 
the navigational equipment and legacy communications 
pathways aboard the USVs serve as the eyes and ears for the 
transiting SAG. All information is then relayed from the 
USV to the warship it is companioning via the tether (see 
Figure 10).129 It is intended that an opponent receive the 
USVs' EM emissions thereby tracking the group by this EW 
means.  
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Figure 10.   SAG at EMCON Tethered to Radiating USVs 
Subsequently, the SAG commander closes to just outside 
SSM range of the enemy surface group. Ordering his warships 
to oblique, the commander has the USVs sever ties with the 
SAG yet continue radiating along their previous path. The 
warships angle off from their electronically loud 
counterparts at EMCON alpha in order to close their 
opponent undetected as shown in Figure 11.  
 




The deception should offer the commander several 
advantages from which to fire his missile salvo. Firstly, 
surprise allows the commander to choose the most opportune 
time to launch his attack. Secondly, opponent EW and screen 
geometry effectiveness is reduced due to the false threat 
vector presented by the USVs. Of course, spoofing the SAG's 
location has other applications beyond targeting an enemy 
with SSMs, but the illustration and advantages serve to 
demonstrate the incredible tactical ability that the USV 
can serve in the SUW EW realm.  
As mentioned previously, the PRC could potentially 
pursue surface-to-surface ARMs making the USV an invaluable 
CT mechanism. A SAG proceeding in the SCS under an EMCON 
condition as pictured in Figure 10 (USVs acting as the eyes 
and ears for the tethered warship) deny ARMs the ability to 
target American combatants. Instead, the PLA-N ARMs would 
home on the USVs. A sound tactic validated by today's 
strategy of launching helicopters from EMCON alpha warships 
in order to draw ARM fire at the aircraft vice the ship. 
By employing USVs, the American fleet can drastically 
alter the EW landscape in the SCS and hedge against ARMs. 
Furthermore, it would reduce risk to aircrews, allowing the 
helicopter asset to remain in service to the commander for 
longer. Additionally, warships are afforded safety from 
ARMs at EMCON alpha without forgoing the ability to conduct 
EM based communications and navigation.   
D. NAVAL OBSCURANTS  
Further complicating targeting for the PLA-N ASCM is 




smoke screen tactics to modern age radar obscurants. Modern 
age obscurants work on the same principle as smoke screens 
did in the 1940s—obstructing the vision of the targeting 
system thereby increasing the likelihood of an enemy miss.   
LCDR Brett Morash, USN, in his research paper, "Naval 
Obscuration" for the Naval War College, investigated the 
adaptation of the U.S. Army's M56E1 Coyote wide area 
obscurant generator for naval application. The M56E1 multi-
spectral smoke generator produces a "smoke" that absorbs or 
scatters visible, infra-red (IR), and millimeter wave (MMW) 
EM energy.130 An advantage in obscuring EM emissions is that 
the radar energy makes two passes through the obscurant 
cloud (once from the missile emitter, and once reflecting 
back from the target) increasing the CT effectiveness.131 
His research also reveals the combined effect of the 
obscurant on the ASCM seeker: 
[T]o reduce RCS below the minimum signal required 
for targeting by an ASCM seeker head, with the 
reflective obscurant causing an increase in radar 
automatic gain control [AGC] thereby causing ASCM 
seeker processor saturation.132  
Additionally, the advances in MMW obscuration for the 
Coyote system are significantly more effective than the 
Super Rapid Blooming Offboard Chaff (SRBOC) presently 
aboard U.S. warships.133 
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In discussing the methods of defeating RCS based 
missiles, Naval Obscuration studied the theoretical effects 
of M56E1's smoke on the ARGS-54 seeker found in the more 
potent SS-N-27 ASCMs. ARGS-54 employs AGC, and a system to 
prevent target overload known as constant false alarm rate 
(CFAR). The Coyote's smoke is believed to significantly 
delay acquisition of ships by the ARGS-54, and quite 
possibly prevent any targeting whatsoever. Even if the EM 
absorbent smoke fails to completely deny the ARGS-54 from 
identifying a ship, the ensuing delay in homing diminishes 
the time available for the Sizzler to enter its high speed, 
evasive weave. This presents a better window of opportunity 
for surface units to engage in hard-kill tactics. The 
tactical commander can also choose not to employ hard-kill 
methods, because when confronted by large radar targets, 
RCS based seekers default to striking the center the 
returned radar energy. Knowing this, the SAG commander can 
place his units away from the center of the smoke cloud 
causing the ASCM to fly harmlessly into the water.134 Such 
CT benefits effect all RCS based ASCMs, "C" series 
included.  
The size of the M56E1 is relatively portable in terms 
of naval application as the Army employs it from the hummer 
vehicle.135 Likely USN Coyote platforms are the SH-60, all 
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warships, and potentially the fleet USV.136 Coverage of a 
surface group is achievable by approximately 6 Coyotes 
units. A team of M56E1s, distributed across surface and air 
platforms, can deliver a highly effective CT "smoke cloud" 
over U.S. SAGs. Combining this existing Army technology 
with USN World War II smoke screen tactics137 provide the 
U.S. fleet a critical and affordable CT method.  
E. CONCLUSIONS 
A major consequence of massing for defense is the 
certainty that the enemy will be aware of the 
fleet and its general location. Then, electronic-
warfare tactics should be designed not to mask 
the presence of the fleet, which is impossible, 
but to complicate the enemy's efforts to track 
and target the key units carrying out the fleet's 
mission—in a word, its striking power.138 
As Kline demonstrates using Hughes' equation, a less 
numerous fleet can achieve parity with a more numerous 
force if CT and or scouting are adjusted in favor of the 
fleet with inferior numbers. The distributed force and 
elevated ship count of the NNFM dramatically reduce CT and 
scouting measures necessary for U.S. surface ships to 
employ in order to surmount PLA-N numerical advantage. When 
including the non-missile combatants in the NNFM fleet, 
American numbers double that of the Chinese. This also 
reduces their chances at killing our missile shooters while 
depleting their missile inventory sooner.  
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CT more than resolves numerical disadvantage. CT 
affords the tactical commander a vast array of SAG 
geometries he can exploit to bring favor on his side in 
combat. USVs fulfill the need for American ships to undergo 
the first wave of attacks, removing ROE restrictions, while 
leaving a predominate number of missile combatants left to 
conduct the first effective strike by means of a 
counterpunch. This CT capability is within reach by 
adjusting RCS profiles of fleet class USVs intended for 
acquisition by the DoN. It is crucial that the ASCM decoy 
role of the USV be realized and enacted upon in subsequent 
USV design. 
LPDI pathways, such as the USAF's FALCON program, 
demonstrate the next level of communications the USN should 
strive for. These agile, high-speed networks open new 
realms of EMCON manipulation bringing in advanced levels of 
stealth and surprise to the U.S. surface forces.  
Additionally, the U.S. has long understood the 
importance of soft-kill measures. Bringing the Army's M56E1 
program into the maritime environment brings a CT 
capability that exceeds SRBOC, diminishes the SS-N-27 
threat, and greatly reduces the effectiveness of PRC ASCMs 
across the board. The Coyote system is relatively low cost, 
and well understood, taking most of its risk in acquisition 
away. 
Numbers are the biggest component to fleet 
preparedness and the PLA-N outnumbers the USN. If America 
stays her present course, she will always enter battle with 




surface force as per the NNFM study approaches parity. 






III. FLEET LIGHTER THAN AIR TECHNOLOGY (LTA)  
In considering the factor of cost as applied to naval 
assets, it is wrong to think of high cost defining a vessel 
as unaffordable to lose in battle. The unit cost (actual 
dollars spent on acquiring, maintaining, and operating a 
ship) is potentially money sent to the bottom of the sea by 
enemy action—sunk cost. Sunk cost has no relevance in war. 
However, cost factors into preparedness. Preparedness is 
reflected in fleet numbers translating into the ability to 
appear around the world in significant force. When budget 
prevents procuring large quantities of high unit cost 
vessels, yet persists in acquiring high unit cost vessels 
in low quantities, an inflexible fleet is formed.  
Not preparing for adequate fleet numbers is on the 
forefront of naval thinker's minds: 
Little more than 13 years ago, with the public 
release of the U.S. Maritime Strategy, then-
Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman Jr. 
effectively argued that a 600-ship Navy was 
necessary to meet a U.S. national-security 
requirement for maritime superiority. Remarkably, 
the Navy today is on the threshold of falling be-
low 300 ships—the smallest fleet since 1931.139 
The same article goes on to articulate the importance 
of weighing fleet numbers against potential military 
engagements in one generic theater of operation.140 Taking 
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such metrics to heart in the SCS, one can see the deficit 
into which the U.S. fleet might be placed. 
The NNFM study addresses ways in which overall fleet 
numbers are enlarged with present SCN projections as 
discussed in the first chapter.141 But, the NNFM only covers 
ships. Not yet discussed is the potential to augment fleet 
forces with airborne ships. Introduction of airships to the 
sea service not only provides on demand communications and 
ISR needs, but complements the Aegis weapons suite, lending 
to the more confident application of DDGs, CGs, and the 
strike groups they defend.  
A. PRINCIPLES AND BACKGROUND OF USN LIGHTER THAN AIR 
TECHNOLOGY (LTA) 
LTA provided mankind his first experience at flight, 
long predating the Wright brothers' famous exercise at 
Kitty Hawk, North Carolina.142 Much has evolved in the LTA 
world since those first balloons took flight. 
1. Design Principles 
LTAs, or "airships," are classified into three 
distinct categories: non-rigid, semi-rigid, and rigid.143 
Recent advances have introduced a fourth design style  
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termed "hybrid." A quick description of the different 
variants of LTA craft will provide a better foundation for 
airship discussion.   
A non-rigid airship is frequently referred to as a 
"blimp." A well known example is the Goodyear Blimp. "Non-
rigid" is determined by: 
The internal pressure of the lifting gas (non-
flammable helium) maintains the shape of the 
envelope, or the airship's polyester fabric skin. 
The only solid parts are the passenger car 
[gondola] and the tail fins. Internal air 
compartments, called ballonets, are inflated or 
deflated with air to compensate for ambient 
pressure differences. These airships have no 
internal framework.144   
Semi-rigid airships are a logical extension of blimps 
characterized by, "a rigid lower keel construction and a 
pressurized envelope above that. The rigid keel can be 
attached directly to the envelope or hung underneath 
it."145 Semi-rigid airship designs were widely used by the 
USN in its LTA era of 1915-1962.146 
The third style of traditional LTA designs is the 
rigid airship, identifiable by: 
[A]n internal frame. The Zeppelins and the USS 
Akron and Macon were famous rigid airships. The 
rigid structure, traditionally an aluminum alloy, 
holds up the form of the airship. In general, 
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rigid airships are only efficient when longer 
than 120 meters (360 ft) because a good weight to 
volume ratio is only achievable for large 
airships.147 
LTA differs from heavier-than-air (HTA) flight due to 
fundamentally different lift principles. HTA uses 
Bernoulli's dynamic, demanding motion over the lifting 
surface to suspend the platform in air. Such motion 
requires the HTA to consume more fuel. The LTA, however, 
relies upon Archimedes' principle of displacement like a 
ship on the water. An airship needs much less fuel for 
propulsion, leaving the majority of fuel consumption for 
electrical generation and stationing.    
All forms of airships undergo altitude and temperature 
changes causing lifting gases inside the envelope to 
fluctuate in both pressure and volume. "Ballonets," filled 
with ambient air, compensate for the lifting gases' 
expansion and contraction. At higher external pressures, 
experienced at lower altitudes, the ballonets are at their 
fullest. As the airship climbs and the lifting gases 
expand, the pilot releases air from the ballonets. Once all 
ambient air is expelled from the ballonets, the airships is 
said to have reached "pressure altitude." Any further climb 
in elevation requires lifting gas, helium, to be released 
or the envelope will potentially burst. Figure 12 is a 
diagram of a typical airship envelope and ballonet system.  
                     
 





Figure 12.   Diagram of Airship Showing Ballonets. From148 
The above diagram helps visualize an airship's 
advantage. The main envelope, in addition to providing 
buoyancy, can house large pieces of equipment. Thus, the 
volume of the envelope is like the interior spaces of a 
warship. The area inside the envelope is quite useful for 
mounting large radar dishes, electronic jamming gear, 
communications suites, and so on. The size of the gear does 
not matter as the envelope and power generating sources can 
scale to accommodate (similar to ship classes which scale 
in displacement to facilitate larger arrangement of 
equipment). As the discussion continues, adaption of this 
free space inside the envelope will undergo examination.  
Hybrid airships are frequently classified as LTA 
crafts. Technically speaking, they are HTA platforms 
requiring motion or vectored thrust to achieve flight. For 
this discussion however, hybrids are grouped under LTA.  
                     
 






Generally, hybrid airships obtain 70% of total lift 
from helium within their envelopes, while the remaining 30% 
is created aerodynamically.149 Visibly different from the 
classic airships, the hybrid's envelope consists of "lobes" 
creating a flatter, horizontally elongated, wing-like 
volume that induces lift while the airship is in motion 
(see Figure 13).  
 
Figure 13.   Hybrid LTA Lifting Principles. From150 
The hybrid is a highly viable type of airship. Its 
strength lies in the minimal support needed in airfield 
facilities and personnel for launch and recovery 
procedures. A traditional airship requires more 
orchestration from ground crews due to its continuous lift 
characteristic that must be appropriately ballasted. 
Nonetheless, both forms of LTA offer true off airfield 
capability.151 
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It is the lift and volume characteristics that make 
the traditional LTA vessel a greater ISR platform than 
hybrids or HTAs. Naturally suspended at altitude, while 
converting a high percentage of its fuel into power for 
electronic suites, the non-hybrid LTA reaches endurances 
far exceeding other aircraft. For the NNFM in the SCS, the 
C4ISR platform of choice is the traditional airship.  
To say hybrids do not have a place in military 
operations is short sighted. The marriage of enormous 
airlift, on the scale of 500 tons, without the assistance 
of developed airfields makes the hybrid an incredible cargo 
asset. The U.S. Army is considering hybrids as a potential 
"fort to fight" platform that can forego unit transport via 
highway, rail, cargo ship, or airplane. Such delivery 
offers improved unit cohesion, reduced transit time, and 
lower transit cost.152  
For the USN, hybrid utilization could lead to a highly 
mobile, and expedient supply chain delivering fuel, 
bullets, and beans to the battle groups at sea with minimal 
protection by the combatants. Additionally, a hybrid 
resupply airship foregoes or reduces the threat from 
submarines, mines, pirates, underwater navigational 
hazards, heavy seas, and FAC. 
2. Graceful Degradation 
Lacking the requirement of constant motion for lift, 
the airship has the added advantage of graceful degradation  
 
                     
 




upon attack. Lockheed Martin studied the effects of 
munitions strike on airships using the latest envelope 
materials (see Table 8). 
 
 
Table 8.   Threat Versus Time to Loss of Lift for LTA. 
From153 
A difficult concept to grasp for the person new to the 
LTA platform is its ability to stay suspended in air after 
receiving attack. This feature is akin to a ship staying 
afloat even after its hull has been pierced, but instead of 
water rushing in, lifting gases are leaking out.  
Some arguments have arisen declaring the airship 
unsuitable for military use because it is susceptible to 
anti-aircraft defenses (AAD) and the nature of war 
sometimes requires LTAs to go into heavily defended, 
                     
 




sovereign airspaces.154 The authors offer that LTAs can 
serve the DoD, particularly the Department of the Navy 
(DoN), extraordinarily well in the international airspaces 
of the open seas with no need to overcome AAD. However, as 
the above table shows, 21 hours after receiving AAD hits 
the airship gracefully lands. The resilient flying capacity 
of an aircraft despite sizable damage is foreign to most 
military thinkers, authors included. Graceful degradation 
affords the opportunity for the platform to persist in its 
mission, as well as providing ample time for the crew to 
plan for rescue if return to base is not accomplishable. 
3. USN LTA Program 
The catalyst for the USN to create an LTA program 
stemmed from the German’s first maiden flight in 1900 of 
their zeppelin airship LZ-1. The airship had military 
potential spurring fears amongst American leadership of 
falling behind the technology curve. Those predictions came 
true when Germany used zeppelins to conduct air raids on 
the Allied in August 1914. Although the raids proved less 
than ideal, the airships enjoyed advantages as scouts in 
maritime patrol and fulfilled a major mine warfare role 
against Great Britain. German preeminence in LTA employment 
pushed the U.S. to develop an airship program as well. 
Although the war ended in 1918, Congress mandated that the 
USN establish an LTA Naval Air Station in Lakehurst, New 
Jersey. The LTA fleet consisted of two airships at the 
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time: one purchased from the British (ZR-2), and its 
domestically constructed counterpart (ZR-1) commissioned as 
the United States Ship (USS) Shenandoah (pictured in Figure 
14).155 
 
Figure 14.   USS Shenandoah (ZR-1) Moored at Sea to USS 
Patoka (AO-9), circa 1924. From156 
The program peaked at 292 airships,157 but suffered a 
decline with the popularity of fixed-wing aircraft.158 
Throughout World War II and into the late 1950s, the 
airships remained numerous and viable. Due to the speed and 
maneuverability of an airplane the airship took a secondary 
role in the military flight community. An added factor was: 
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[I]mprovements to antiaircraft weapons during and 
after the war led military planners to conclude 
later that airships would be too slow and too 
vulnerable to attack from the ground, 
particularly when facing a technologically 
capable adversary such as the Soviet Union. 
Therefore, interest in airships waned.159  
These analysts are correct to point out the disparity 
between the airship and HTAs in regard to AAD, and air-to-
air combat (AAC). HTAs enjoy advantages in speed and 
maneuverability that LTAs cannot match. Were AAD and AAC 
concerns reason enough not to consider an airborne asset 
worthy of DoD investment, where would the U.S. be without 
the services of air-to-air refuelers, maritime patrol 
aircraft, search and rescue helicopters, cargo planes, 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), airborne warning and 
control system (AWACS), and take charge and move out 
(TACAMO) aircraft?  
4. Prejudice 
In sifting through LTA history and by speaking with 
members of the communities involved it is the opinion of 
the authors that obsolete prejudice against LTA technology 
prevents its proper adoption for military application.  
It is time to lift the veil from LTA and formulate 
appropriate applications of airships by noting their 
advantages in fuel consumption, power availability, and 
persistence. It is unwise to predict how much benefit is 
gained from airships, but it is emphatically unwise to 
                     
 





dismiss their potential. Given the budgetary climate of the 
DoD, the resource conservation aspect of LTA excites 
interest as well as spurs rebuke, especially from programs 
looking to survive in lean times.  
Aside from this, the Hindenburg tragedy still persists 
in the minds of some. Modern airship construction is vastly 
different than LZ-129 Hindenburg. Hindenburg's rigid 
envelope was painted with a varnish containing aluminum 
powder in order to give the zeppelin its trademark silver 
appearance. Aluminum in this form is essentially solid-
state rocket fuel. It fed the visible flames captured on 
film that fateful day. Hydrogen was used as the lifting 
gas. However, when hydrogen burns it is invisible to the 
human eye and has been discredited as the source of the 
Hindenburg fire. Nevertheless, current airship designs 
employ the use of helium, as it is a fire suppressant. 
Similarly, modern envelope materials vastly improve airship 
safety.160 It is time to move past the Hindenburg incident 
as has been done with the Titanic.  
Most importantly to some, airships look like an odd 
duck. Questions of whether it is piloted by aviators or 
submariners, or rather commanded by surface warriors all 
address issues of form, not function. Adoption by a warfare 
community and the creation of new traditions will play out 
in the airship realm over time. Troubling oneself about 
LTA's effect on image is not strategically, tactically, nor 
operationally important. Place the mission first.  
                     
 




5. Resurging Interest in LTA 
There are four root principles that make airships an 
attractive platform:161 
1. Fuel efficiency coupled with high fuel prices. 
2. Persistent airborne ISR. 
3. Airborne platform with little gyration removing 
hardening requirements for electronic suites.  
4. Immense adaptability in volume and payload for 
cargo operations. 
Adoption of LTA technology in today’s military is a 
necessity due to its ubiquitous application and "greener" 
energy consumption. As an ISR asset, it would provide 
invaluable persistence surpassing any other single ISR 
platform we have at our disposal today with the exception 
of satellites.  
Additionally, LTAs do not cause stress on their 
equipment as do HTAs. Helicopters and airplanes, through a 
combination of vibration, speed, and maneuvering, require 
on-board equipment to be especially hardened for their 
demanding operating environment. The airship, as a fast 
moving, steady sailing ship, does not require such 
hardening. Commercial grade electronics are flyable on 
LTAs, reducing cost burdens of making military-grade 
equipment, as well as facilitating a fertile platform for 
technology experimentation and upgrades.  
In a satellite-denied environment, the airship can 
establish links with other LTA craft and create a pathway 
back to an unblocked satellite, ground stations, or SAGs. 
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As an ISR asset, the tactical commander can make timely 
decisions by monitoring friendly and enemy movement through 
the vantage point of high, networked airborne systems. 
Knowing where friendly and enemy combatants are moving 
through the battle space allows him to coordinate and 
vector ships or weapons with confidence, while anticipating 
his opponent's actions.  
Recently proposed DoD airships have undertaken many 
designs. Figure 15 summarizes the different styles, sizes, 
and operating altitudes of prospective DoD LTA platforms. 
Make special note of the Blue Devil II airship under the 





Figure 15.   Summary of Proposed DoD Airships. From162 
                     
 
162 Congressional Budget Office, "Military Airships," under, 




B. LTA AS AEGIS OVER THE HORIZON TARGETING (OTHT) 
PLATFORM 
Formidable as the Aegis radar is, a shortcoming lies 
in its line of sight (LOS) limitation caused by the 
curvature of the Earth. This phenomenon creates a highly 
vulnerable low altitude attack vector. This has spurred 
enemy development of sea-skimming ASCMs and low approach 
tactics in combat aviation.163 
With this in mind, PLA-N ships or aircraft armed with 
C-802s can stand off from USN forces up to 100 nm and fire 
a volley of missiles.164 Using unclassified numbers, the 
PLA-N offensive pulse will go unseen by the USN Aegis 
missile system until roughly 18 nm from the SAG. This 
leaves around 100 seconds for the American surface forces 
to notice, track, target, and neutralize the strike.165 
Should the PLA-N strike with the SS-N-27 instead, 
approximately 9 seconds are afforded an SM-2 strike before 
Sizzler transitions into its highly evasive, terminal 
weave.166  
This discussion is not aimed at determining if Aegis 
will defeat the PLA-N pulse in the time frame mentioned 
above, but rather to offer a means of extending this 
                     
 
163 Low approach tactics were used by the Argentine Air Force in the 
Falkland War as captured by ADM Sandy Woodward, RN, in his book One 
Hundred Days.  
164 As per I.A.2.a.7. 
165 The authors offer these numbers for illustrative purposes for the 
unfamiliar reader. It is understood that classified analysis on the 
topic exist. For calculations Aegis is assumed to have a height of eye 
of 100 ft, Saccade missiles height is 20 ft, and Saccade speed is 0.9 
Mach. 




engagement window further out from U.S. forces in order to 
improve the defensive power of the American SAG in the SCS 
(see Figure 16).  
 
Figure 16.   Aegis Airborne Adjunct. From167 
An airborne Aegis adjunct overcomes the limitations of 
the ship's LOS and multiplies the SAG's detect-to-engage 
sequence window. Wayne E. Meyer, the driving force behind 
the Aegis weapon system, notably stated that the air 
adjunct is, "[A]bsolutely vital and complementary for the 
battle force."168 Current observation of Aegis yields the 
same conclusion. This multi-billion dollar weapon, so 
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effective against targets it can see, has this Achilles 
heal. The prestige and cost of the Aegis warship makes it 
even more critical to protect with reliable eyes in the 
sky. 
The current Navy plan to satisfy the need is to 
develop an HTA platform. The crux of the problem is 
detecting sea-skimming shapes the size of missiles or 
larger. One answer the authors do not endorse is to affix 
an Aegis radar to an air platform. Power, cooling, and 
space limitations make airborne Aegis exceedingly 
difficult.  
An alternative is to give the air element a less 
sophisticated radar and fire control system. The primary 
problem with this approach arises when the radar system 
tries to distinguish low flying objects from sea clutter. 
The radar definition required to achieve the level of 
fidelity needed to distinguish a missile-sized objected 
from a wave top again drives to cumbersome sizes.169  
An analysis of applying such a radar dish to an HTA 
was conducted in the late 1980s by the Center for Naval 
Analyses (CNA).170 It was determined that a 48 ft by 13 ft 
radome could be affixed 15 ft above the fuselage of a 
Boeing 747 as shown in Figure 17.  
                     
 
169 Meyers, "Airship Program," 5. 
170 Center for Naval Analyses, Airship Operational Utility Analysis, 
Report 94014800 (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, 1988) 





Figure 17.   HTA Aegis Adjunct: 747 with Radome. From171 
Even large HTAs such as the 747 do not carry the space 
necessary for illuminators thereby foregoing the 
requirement to extend the SM-2's engagement window against 
the low approach threat. Additionally, the threat is an 
around the clock real world problem. A symphony of land 
based 747s relieving each other in procession used to 
maintain a continuous watch over the battle group is 
infeasible. A more practical solution is presented in 
Figure 18. 
                     
 





Figure 18.   LTA as Full Aegis Adjunct Complete with 
Illuminators. From172 
On the other hand, employing an LTA as the airborne 
Aegis adjunct resolves the time on station problem, the 
power requirement, and spatial needs to house the large 
radar and illuminators. Recall how space inside an LTA's 
envelope, aside from the ballonets, is free for mounting 
equipment (see Figure 12). That space can house a radar 
large enough for this particular mission. To assist in the 
perspective of scale, Figure 19 shows the relation between 
a 747 and a formerly commissioned USN airship YEZ-2A. 
                     
 





Figure 19.   Boeing 747 and Airship YEZ-2A. From173 
The low flyer threat to Aegis hinders confident and 
widespread use of American Destroyers and Cruisers. Aegis' 
Wayne E. Meyer saw the prudence of including an air adjunct 
and notably understood that LTA, not HTA, could only 
properly fulfill such a role. Creating an airship based on 
the dimensions and capabilities of former USN airship YEZ-
2A brings a platform large enough to house the required 
radar and illuminators to extend Aegis' and the SM-2's 
engagement window further out from the SAG. The SA brought 
by such an airborne asset will also ease the burdens of 
defensive counter air stations (DCA), which consume such a 
large portion of the carrier strike group (CSG) operations. 
A highly developed system such as Aegis needs the best ISR 
that can be provided to safeguard America's fleet and its 
personnel.  
                     
 




C. C4ISR AIRSHIP IN THE SCS 
1. The USAF Blue Devil II as NNFM C4ISR Airship 
A needed application of LTA technology for the surface 
fleet in the SCS is a C4ISR airborne node giving the 
American commander SA, LPDI communications, and better 
EMCON measures, while burdening PLA-N commanders with 
another layer to overcome. As demonstrated, many variants 
of airships are available for application. A principle of 
the NNFM however is exploiting platforms already understood 
and relatively low cost in order to multiply the 
effectiveness of the U.S. fleet while avoiding risky new 
developments. The well-developed USAF Blue Devil II (BDII) 
airship program offers a robust and viable C4ISR node to 
USN forces in the SCS. It is a pertinent starting point for 
renewed USN LTA endeavors.  
BDII is a moderately sized airship with an overall 
length of 350 ft, envelope volume of 1.3 million ft3, a max 
airspeed of 80 kts, and a max altitude of 20,000 ft (see 
Figure 20). Suspending two gondolas, the BDII offers a 
compartment for piloting controls and mission payloads 
forward and an aft car containing propulsion and power 
generating equipment. The forward gondola measures 23 by 10 
by 7 ft. An important feature of the command car is its 
ability to accommodate interchangeable C4ISR packages based 
on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 463L 
universal air pallet system. Palletization of C4ISR gear 
allows mission payloads to be interchanged by ground crews 





lbs with a 3 day mission endurance. At payloads of 2,500 
lbs or less mission times in excess of five days are 
achievable.174 
 
Figure 20.   Blue Devil II. From175 
BDII arose from a Combatant Commander's (COCOM) 
integrated priority list (IPL) specifying the need for 
detecting improvised explosive device (IED) insertion in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. An airborne motion sensing ISR 
platform was the most viable solution. However, persistence 
is key to effective ISR, something HTA UAVs with staying 
times under 24 hours could not feasibly provide. Analysis 
of alternatives showed an airship to be a worthy platform 
for this mission and was thus the genesis of BDII.176  
                     
 
174 Jane's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, "MAV6 M1400-I Blue 
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In describing the capabilities of the BDII, the Joint 
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) 
describe the airship as a: 
[U]nique, developmental, integrated, multi-
intelligence, auto-tipping and cueing C-IED 
[Counter Improvised Explosive Device] airborne 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
(ISR) [platform that integrates] the highest 
resolution wide field-of-view electro-optical 
sensor with high-definition cameras and signals 
intelligence geo-location sensors.177 
While the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) 
details:  
The Blue Devil II system is an Air Force led 
single ship technology and concept demonstration 
of multi-intelligence, cross-platform tipping and 
cueing of fused SIGINT [signals intelligence], 
wide area and high-definition EO/IR [electric 
optics/infra-red] motion imagery on a persistent 
lighter-than-air airship.178  
The USAF further imposes the following systems on 
BDII: the Sierra Nevada Gorgon Stare and BAE 
Systems/Lockheed Martin autonomous real-time ground 
ubiquitous surveillance imaging system as wide-area 
airborne surveillance sensors (WAAS),179 the Tactical 
Targeting Network Technology (TTNT), the Tactical Common 
                     
 
 177 Jane's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, "MAV6," under 
"Development." 
178 Defense Technology Information Center, "RDT&E Budget Item 
Justification, PB 2012 Air Force" (Fort Belvoir, VA: DTIC, February 
2011), http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2012/AirForce/ 
0305205F_7_PB_2012.pdf. 
 179 UAS Vision, "US Air Force Funds $86M Blue Devil 2 Demonstration 





DataLink (TCDL), and the Remotely Operated Video Enhanced 
Receiver (ROVER).180 The resulting mixture of technologies 
are summarized in the Figure 22. 
 
Figure 21.   Blue Devil II Concept Diagram. From181 
Overcoming the jargon and new technologies can be 
problematic with BDII. MAV6, the company responsible for 
creating BDII, succinctly describes the true mission of its 
LTA platform as, "[A]irship-based C4ISR aerial fusion node 
and weapon system platform.”182 The numerous technologies 
all have application and potential in DoD service. It is, 
                     
 
 180 Jane's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, "MAV6," under 
"Description." 
 181 UAS Vision, "Blue Devil 2." 





however, acceptable to scale back the experimental 
technologies and outfit BDII airship with proven C4ISR 
gear. Such a marriage produces invaluable intelligence and 
communications capabilities with sustained operating times. 
The C4ISR airship can dramatically shift the advantage 
in favor of the U.S. in the SCS. A proven example of 
airborne ISR technology available for adoption to airship 
use is the Orion EP-3 variant. Arising from increasing ISR 
demands of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, the P-3 underwent 
numerous signals intelligence (SIGINT) upgrades. The 
combined intelligence and detections suites fall under the 
Airborne Reconnaissance Integrated Electronics Suite 
(ARIES) II heading.183 Highlights of ARIES II include: 
• AN/ALR-76 radar band electronic support (ES) 
system 
• AN/ALR-84 radar band processor/receiver 
• OE-319 "Big Look" antenna group 
• AN/APN-234 weather/navigation radar 
• AN/APS-134(V)2 surveillance radar 
• OA-9306/A video distribution units 
• AN/ALQ-10 indentify friend or foe (IFF) 
countermeasures set 
• AN/USH-33(V)2 data recorder set184 
The list of available and proven DoD C4ISR 
systems adaptable to airships are too numerous to mention. 
What the authors wish to show is that well-established RF 
communications paths, video and radar surveillance, and 
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data path nodes are applicable to LTAs. The NNFM envisions 
these capabilities airborne and continuously available to 
the SAG commander in a distributed constellation of 
airships across the SCS. 
2. NNFM C4ISR Airship SCS Operations  
a. Operating Area 
As pictured in Figure 22, the primary area of 
operations in the SCS is a 700 by 1,200 nm "box."  
 
Figure 22.   SCS Operating Area. From185 
At the southern reaches of the box it is likely 
that carriers and other high value units are able to 
operate outside the threat of DF-21's 1,000 nm range. 
                     
 





However, progressing inwards increases problems for the 
U.S. surface fleet as PRC A2AD increases. 
b. C4ISR, Footprint, and Manning 
An important facet of potential conflict in the 
SCS is the "deterrence phase," which is a pre-conflict time 
in which the U.S. can best shape the potential battle space 
in its favor. A tremendous ally is the C4ISR LTA 
constellation providing continuous, real-time tracking of 
PLA-N forces. The constellation of airships provides a data 
network potentially in the gigabit per second range 
(employing a laser based communications system such as 
FALCON), downlinks back to the terrestrial network, RF 
communications redundancy, and a theater-wide Link 16 for a 
common operating picture (COP). Figure 23 depicts how a 
constellation of airships such as the BDII can 
cooperatively provide satellite type C4ISR. 
 
Figure 23.   C4ISR Airship Constellation Conceptual Diagram. 
From186 
                     
 





It is recommended that each of our C4ISR airships 
is manned rather than be remotely operated. Outweighing the 
risk to personnel, the LTA's persistence in mission during 
armed conflict serves the greater needs of overall fleet 
operations in the SCS. Remote guidance introduces several 
factors that could lead to C4ISR airship mission failure: 
reliance on GPS, inability to recover from EMP attack, lack 
of casualty control or trouble shooting for C4ISR system 
failures, and inability to prudently determine when to 
abandon station or persist in mission in the event of 
envelope damage.  
The envelope ceiling of BDII is 20,000 ft, but 
introducing aircrews brings the LTA's operating altitude 
down to 10,000 ft. This is to accommodate habitability 
requirements for personnel in an unpressurized cabin. A 
10,000 ft ceiling simplifies the technical aspects of the 
airship used, reduces cost in operation and maintenance, 
while potentially sidestepping roadblocks more complicated 
systems experience in the acquisition process.  
Our C4ISR airship's footprint at operating 
altitude is therefore 250 nm. Coverage of a 700 by 1,200 nm 
SCS operating area is achievable by a constellation of 15 





Figure 24.   NNFM C4ISR Airship Constellation Operating 
Area (A Circle Depicts a 250 nm Footprint) 
In the northeast corner one notices three LTA 
circles transiting from the SCS towards Okinawa. These 
additional LTA stations link back to the terrestrial 
network in Okinawa if access to the global information grid 
(GIG) via Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia were 
denied. It is understood by the authors that GIG entry 
stations in those areas do not yet exist. It is our 
recommendation that redundant access sites are established 
in the terrestrial environments surrounding the SCS, 
facilitating a cascading mode of entry for American forces 




To that end, it is also foreseeable that the NNFM 
airship constellation network might better serve American 
strategy if it is independent of the GIG. During conflict, 
it is possible that PRC cyber forces will infiltrate 
elements of the DoD network. In that case, a stand alone, 
theater area network (TAN) provided by the airship 
constellation might prove invaluable. The Maritime 
Operational Commander (MOC) could securely direct U.S. 
surface forces in the SCS via the constellation network 
while reaching back to higher authorities via highly secure 
measures such as the Joint Worldwide Intelligence 
Communications Systems (JWICS). In this configuration, the 
MOC serves as an air-gapped bridge between national and 
airship constellation information networks.  
c. Basing, Transit Times, and Endurance 
We must not ignore basing for the airships in the 
region. Ideally the Philippines would serve as the primary 
base. Proximity of the Philippines to the operating area 
makes the longest transit time for an airship 12 hrs to 
reach the southwest corner.187 Average stationing time for 
the constellation is approximately 6 hours, but on station 
time will be upwards of 90 hours.188 Suspicion of the 
Philippine government towards the PRC, combined with a  
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history of cooperation with the U.S., and advantageous 
geographical position makes this location the best spot for 
airship basing.  
Vietnam should also be considered. Of the 
surrounding locations that are likely to oppose PRC action, 
Vietnam offers the lowest transit times for airship 
stationing. The northeast and southeast corners of the 
constellation box would each take just under 9 hours to 
reach, for an average transit time of 5 hours.189 Vietnam 
basing results in LTA times on station around 100 hrs.190  
Geographically less ideal are basing airships in 
Okinawa or Singapore. These two areas, already home to DoN 
operations, offer a reliable location to stage airship 
operations should assistance from Vietnam or the 
Philippines not be possible. Representative of LTA proceed 
times for Singapore as well, Okinawa's farthest transit is 
18 hours to the southwestern operating area. Average time 
to station from Okinawa is 12 hours yielding a time on 
station upwards of 80 hrs.191 
d. Vital Airship Constellation EMCON Benefits 
Traditionally, ships at EMCON forego SA and radar 
tracking capability so as to go undetected by the opponent. 
Outfitting both SAG ships and C4ISR airships with LPDI 
communications such as FALCON provide the commander 
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continuous communications both within and beyond the battle 
group. Additionally, stealthily tracking a PLA-N adversary 
through the network of C4ISR airships gives the American 
commander incredible agility in choosing when and where to 
engage an opponent. The value of LPDI communications to a 
C4ISR constellation allowing the SAG to operate with SA at 
EMCON cannot be adequately expressed in words. It is 
potentially a game changer in fleet on fleet engagements.  
e. Misdirection using Airships 
(1) During peacetime operations, the SAG 
should deploy with the airship operating continuously over 
the center of the group. An opponent, such as the PRC, may 
equate locating American surface combatants with finding 
the LTA. In war however, the SAG can proceed at EMCON at 
the outskirts of the LTA's footprint thereby misdirecting 
their location while maintain LPDI communications and SA.  
Further advantages in misdirection might 
outweigh the loss of overhead connectivity of the SAG with 
the airship if misdirection results in a surprise offensive 
pulse. This is potentially achievable if the SAG proceeds 
ahead of their LTA footprint arriving within striking 
distance of the PLA-N in advance of what the opponent 
commander expects.  
(2) The entire constellation of C4ISR can 
potentially shift hundreds of miles in a direction, leaving 
a portion of the SCS uncovered. An uncovered portion might 
lead PLA-N commanders to assume USN forces do not intend to 
operate within that area. Such an assumption may reduce the 




strike by the U.S. fleet more successful. Additionally, 
such fleet engagements offer the advantage of surprise for 
the American forces.  
Further geometries between the SAG and the 
airship abound, offering additional tactical possibilities. 
The tactics offered here are examples to demonstrate such 
possibilities. We expect that as airships integrate into 
surface operations, the PRC's A2AD effort will be further 
alleviated by having to confront new layers of American 
forces. Attention of the PLA-N commanders aimed at 
countering airships is a focus taken away from the surface 
combatants themselves.  
3. Take Charge and Move Out (TACAMO) 
The E-6B TACAMO procedure of creating vertical antenna 
for VLF communications with submarine forces is greatly 
simplified aboard an airship. Presently the E-6B, a 
modified Boeing 707, proceeds from continental U.S. (CONUS) 
to a portion of the ocean where an American submarine is 
operating. Once on station, the E-6B conducts an "orbit 
maneuver" in order to whip a 15,000 ft tail into 
approximately 8,000 ft of vertical antenna. The orbit is 
sustained for two to three hours, and the overall mission 
time of the E-6B with refueling is a maximum of 72 hours 
including transit.192  
Outfitting an airship such as the BDII with a VLF 
antenna is a simpler mode of communication with friendly 
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submarine forces. Operating at low speeds while at 10,000 
ft of elevation, an upright, dipole, VLF antenna is 
achievable without an orbit maneuver. A VLF communications 
link, combined with an SCS operations "playbook," 
potentially provides the commander the means to update his 
subsurface forces and alter tasking as regional tensions 
and focal points fluctuate. This allows the subsurface 
warriors to run deep while still aware of operations above. 
Furthermore, it makes the modified Ohio class more viable 
for Tomahawk and special operating forces (SOF) tasking.  
D. BALLOON-BORNE REPEATER 
In the event of satellite denial by the PRC, legacy, 
beyond LOS (BLOS), RF communications are achievable via LTA 
methods other than airships. The Space Data Corporation 
(SDC) has developed a high altitude balloon capable of 
suspending up to 12 lbs of RF gear at elevations from 
60,000 to 100,000 ft (see Figure 25). This gear can provide 
low bandwidth data connectivity, satellite like voice 
networks, and ISR (see Figure 26).193 
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Figure 25.   SDC's Ballon-borne Repeater. From194 
The USAF contracted the SDC to develop their 
commercial balloon into a military RF repeater compatible 
platform in 2005. SDC dubbed the resulting platform 
StarFighter, which was:  
[T]ested extensively in the miltary UHF band for 
both voice and data transmissions. Voice testing 
incorporated analog and digital transmission 
methods, and the digital voice tests used both 
encrypted and unencrypted links. These tests 
supported ground-based users with military 
portable radios such as the PRC-148 and PRC-117. 
During a September 2007 Air Force Research 
Laboratory demonstration, a StarFighter payload 
floating around 79,000 feet above eastern New 
Mexico enabled communications between 
participants across the state. Both voice and 
                     
 




data communications were conducted via the 
StarFighter balloon-borne platform during the 
demonstration, using Thales PRC-148/MBITRs for 
voice, and ViaSat VDC-600 Data Controllers 
interfaced to Thales MBITR for data exchange.195 
At peak elevation, StarFighter projects a 400-mile 
footprint and has a 12 hr battery life. When configured for 
UHF voice, StarFighter offers one channel dedicated to 
communications, and the second channel is used to command 
the balloon into station. Once on station however, the 
command channel is then available for UHF voice offering 
two circuits for every balloon launched. Up to four 
balloons are controllable by a single command station. Each 
balloon costs around $11,000 and their command station cost 
is approximately $50,000. Command stations have indefinite 
lifetimes, and recovered balloons can be serviced to fly 
repeat missions.196  
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Figure 26.   Ballon-borne ISR from StarFighter. From197 
Balloon-borne repeaters also prove menacing to defeat. 
Targeting and killing is nearly impossible unless using a 
blanket method such as an EMP. In such a scenario, recovery 
is achieved by launching the next procession of balloons 
thereby making complete denial of this low cost RF strategy 
unlikely.  
For the SCS, StarFighter, or a similar system of 
balloon-borne RF repeaters, offers a very attractive means 
to regain UHF voice and data satellite communications 
should the PRC effectively block or destroy the traditional 
paths. The major limitation to balloon-borne communications 
is the relatively small footprint it offers preventing the 
capability of theater wide communication on a common net 
via a single balloon. However, the potential to mesh areas 
                     
 




of coverage into a common voice circuit arises with 
geographic distribution of ships, command stations, and 
perhaps covert repeaters spread throughout the remote 
islands of the SCS. Larger and more sophisticated payloads 
are potentially deployable onto balloons with improved lift 
capacity. An advanced balloon-borne system could 
potentially offer inter-balloon communications via similar 
methods discussed for airships or presently used by 
satellites.  
Regardless, StarFighter allows SAGs continued use of 
"satellite" UHF command circuits if satellites are no 
longer an option. In addition to providing needed 
redundancy to HF circuits thereby overcoming high 
susceptibility to jamming, balloon-borne UHF allows the 
SAGs the advantage of operating via its more familiar and 
rehearsed method of covered UHF voice circuits. Familiarity 
of course can reduce the fog of war.  
E. CONCLUSIONS 
BDII is a known entity that is presently adaptable to 
serve in a satellite-type function. Furthermore, the real 
time COP and high-speed communications offered by the 
airship constellation are invaluable. When compared to HTA 
alternatives, airship technology reduces fuel consumption, 
and developmental costs, while improving on station time 
endurance. The culmination of such factors into a single 
C4ISR platform deployable to the potentially satellite 
denied environment of the SCS ought to draw considerable 




Airships also expand overall fleet numbers at modest 
cost, and complicate A2AD for the PRC. Chinese planners 
will have to overcome LTA sensors to better hide the 
movement and actions of their forces. Should the PRC decide 
to free themselves of the LTA network, strikes at an 
airship remove ROE limitations on U.S. surface forces.  
An LTA constellation provides an air-gapped TAN for 
the MOC reducing risk on operational security (OPSEC) 
imposed by PRC cyber forces. Additionally, an SCS playbook 
combined with airship VLF antenna provides the MOC a means 
to update his subsurface forces.  
Airships can also offer critical air early warning for 
the Aegis weapon system. An LTA outfitted with high 
fidelity radar and SM-2 illuminators can push the missile 
threat further away from the heart of the SAG. Such an 
airship offers renewed confidence and application of DDGs, 
CGs, and CVNs in the low flyer threat environment. 
With ballon-borne repeaters, PRC denial of U.S. UHF 
voice and data links is temporary at best. The familiarity 
of satellite voice nets for the tactical watchstander in 
the SAG reduces the fog of war. 
LTA demands attention in these trying times of 
increased PRC threat, and decreased budgets. Airships are a 
proven technology that can best serve the USN if operated 
by crews, at lower altitudes, and outfitted with already 
developed C4ISR equipment so as to guard against program 
deadly requirements growth. Airships have served the nation 





The special value of a more distributed 
capability achieved by greater numbers can be 
shown mathematically and operationally. 
Mathematically, it has been proven that if an 
enemy has twice as many ships attacking, then in 
an exchange of fire, the other fleet to achieve 
parity in losses must have twice the offensive 
power, twice the defensive power, and twice the 
staying power. The operational insight comes from 
observing that when a ship is put out of action 
it loses all three of its combat properties—
offensive, defensive, and staying power—
simultaneously. It cannot be emphasized too 
strongly that delivering a first unanswered salvo 
is the best tactic when it can be achieved.198 
American surface forces have not engaged in true fleet 
on fleet action since World War II, and naval preparedness 
for such action has notably withered since the closing of 
the Cold War. As then Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman, 
Jr. noted the USN approaches a low in the surface force 
level not seen since the 1930s.199 In this naval missile 
warfare era, the Hughes missile salvo equation focuses the 
minds of naval strategists to the key elements of success: 
fleet numbers, staying power, scouting, targeting, and 
above all else effectively striking first. Understanding 
the imposed restrictions of ROE on the U.S. surface forces, 
Hughes' elements of success are even more critical.  
The SCS scenario presents true challenges to American 
survival in terms of fleet numbers. The Chinese Houbei 
                     
 
198 Hughes, "New Navy Fighting Machine," 46. 





warship alone will constitute 100 enemy missile combatants 
in the PLA-N inventory. The NNFM study demonstrates how at 
the present SCN budgets, American missile combatant numbers 
can increase and approach parity with the PLA-N. The NNFM 
combined presence of both missile and non-missile vessels 
achieve a 2:1 USN to PLA-N ratio and muddle the 
effectiveness of Chinese missile targeting. The authors 
depart slightly from the NNFM study and recommend that all 
commissioned USN ships carry at least six SSMs. Outfitting 
all vessels, even patrol sized ships, with missiles makes 
that combatant relevant in the "missile era." Historical 
numbers reveal that approximately one in three missiles 
fired at an opponent are successful.200 With at least six 
SSMs, even the smallest USN warship can reasonably kill two 
enemy vessels thereby contributing greatly in the factors 
of modern naval warfare.  
Further complicating targeting for PRC ASCMs are the 
NNFM fleet USVs, and naval obscurant strategies. Both 
exploit the shortcomings of Chinese ASCM RCS based terminal 
homing. Any further USV development must include the ASCM 
decoy role achieved by increasing the USV's radar 
reflectivity. With USVs functioning as communications 
nodes, new EMCON procedures are obtainable as well. This 
reduces PRC scouting effectiveness while increasing the 
tactical viability of the American SAG commander. 
Additionally, combining American smoke screen tactics from 
World War II with modern radar obscurant technologies 
creates soft-kill techniques viable for present day SCS 
                     
 




operations. With these modern obscurants and obscurant 
delivery vehicles already developed and available, the USN 
ought to quickly transpose those capabilities onto the SUW 
community.  
The big player in these findings is the airship, which 
dramatically improves all facets of naval warfare. Airships 
increase overall fleet numbers. Their constellation 
provides theater-wide scouting, targeting, and networking. 
In networking, the airship improves OPSEC for the MOC, 
delivers VLF communications to the subsurface assets, and 
provides SA for the surface group commander while his ships 
proceed at EMCON. An Aegis airborne adjunct extends the SM-
2 engagement window BLOS improving staying power of the 
DDG/CG SAGs, as well as increasing Aegis' overall potential 
use in the highly contentious SCS. Airships also serve as a 
war warning, noting that the PRC will most likely strike at 
the constellation prior to any attacks on U.S. surface 
groups. A war warning facilitates an effective American 
first strike and achieves the paramount maxim of naval 
warfare. In short, the airship increases CT, increases 
scouting, increases fleet numbers, and reduces PRC first 
strike effectiveness. All of our research leads us to 
conclude that no single asset raises America's fortune in 
the SCS scenario more than the C4ISR airship. It is 
strongly recommended that the DoN pursue a manned airship 
fleet, outfitted with current DoD C4ISR gear (adding 
optical nodes when the technology matures), in order to 




This NNFM is an agile fleet, able to answer the risks 
of war, and crafted under the tenants of the present 




V. RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
A fruitful area for further research would be to 
examine a USN fleet specific C4ISR airship. Such a study 
should determine what present day communications and 
surveillance gear should go onto an airship thereby 
enumerating overall mission package weight, cost, and 
endurance. 
A rewarding endeavor might also be found in contacting 
USAF laboratory and create a sea surface-to-air FALCON 
link. Such research could reveal any potential problems 
with locating laser based communications nodes aboard 
surface vessels. Additional areas of interest might be the 
effects of salt buildup on transceiver protective covering. 
Another thesis might examine the terrestrial 
environment of the SCS in order to recommend locations for 
RF or cellular phone repeaters for a tactical network. 
Lastly, an airship with its scalable size and power 
supply might prove to be an incredible platform for 
electronic jamming. A thesis investigating an LTA EW jammer 








LIST OF REFERENCES 
Air Force Research Laboratory. Observations of Atmospheric 
Effects for FALCON Laser Communication System Flight 
Test. Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: 2010.  
Althoff, William F. Skyships: A history of the Airship in 
the United States Navy. New York, NY: Orion Books, 
1990.  
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Cost Inflation Calculator. 
(n.d.), http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator. 
htm 
Center for Naval Analyses. Airship Operational Utility 
Analysis. Report 94014800. Alexandria, VA: Center for 
Naval Analysis, 1988. 
Chang, Gordon. "Hilary Clinton Changes America's China 
Policy." Forbes, July 28, 2010, http://www.forbes.com/ 
2010/07/28/china-beijing-asia-hilary-clinton-opinions-
columnists-gordon-g-chang.html. 
Congressional Budget Office. "Recent Development Efforts 
for Military Airships." Washington, DC: November, 
2011, http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/ 
cbofiles/attachments/11-01-Airships.pdf. 
Crowder, Doug. “Storm Warnings?” Proceedings Magazine 138, 
no. 4 (April 2012): 18-23. 
Defense Technology Information Center. "RDT&E Budget Item 
Justification, PB 2012 Air Force." Fort Belvoir, VA: 
DTIC, February 2011, http://www.dtic.mil/ 
descriptivesum/Y2012/AirForce/ 0305205F_7_PB_2012.pdf. 
Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review. 
Washington, DC: Pentagon, February 2010.  
Department of the Navy. “The Navy Unmanned Surface Vehicle 





Dillow, Clay. "Blue Devil Airship is Getting a Super-High-
Speed Optical Laser Downlink Upgrade." Popular 




Dutton, Peter. "Three Disputes and Three Objectives: China 
and the South China Sea," Naval War College Review, 
Autumn 2011, http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/ 
feb516bf-9d93-4d5c-80dc-d5073ad84d9b/Three-Disputes-
and-Three-Objectives--China-and-the. 
Erickson, Andrew S., Abraham M. Denmark, and Gabriel 
Collins. "Beijing's 'Starter Carrier' and Future 
Steps: Alternatives and Implications." Naval War 
College Review, Winter 2012, http://www.usnwc.edu/ 
getattachment/647f61ae-c554-4475-b344-6e3b8c3d551f/ 
Beijing-s--Starter-Carrier--and-Future-Steps--Alte. 
Ewing, Phillip. “LCS 2 Delays Trials After Engine Issue.” 
Military Times, June 29, 2009, http://militarytimes. 
com/news/2009/06/navy_lcs2_delay_062909w/. 
Fisher, Dan. "White Paper: Hybrid Aircraft Survivability." 
Marietta, GA: Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company, 
2006. 
Global Security. “FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry-Class.” Global 
Security, July 7, 2011.  
Goodyear. “Airship Types.” (n.d.), http://www.goodyear 
blimp.com/cfmx/web/blimp/basics/airship_types.cfm,  
Haaretz, Amos Harel. “Soldier Killed, 3 Missing after Navy 
Vessel Hit off the Beirut Coast.” Amos Harel Haaretz 
Paper, July 15, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/ 
news/soldier-killed-3-missing--after-navy-vessel-hit-
off-beirut-coast-1.193112. 
Halsey Group Three Alpha. "Naval Obscurants." Newport, RI: 
Naval War College, (n.d.). 
Hughes, Wayne P., Jr. Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat. 




Hughes, Wayne P., Jr. “The New Navy Fighting Machine: A 
Study of the Connections Between Contemporary Policy, 
Strategy, Sea Power, Naval Operations, and the 
Composition of the United States Fleet.” Monterey, CA: 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2009. 
Jane's Electronic Missions Aircraft. "Boeing E-6 Mercury." 
September 26, 2011. 
———."Lockheed Martin EP-3E." March 23, 2012.  
Jane's Strategic Weapons System, "Club/Caliber (SS-N-27/-30 
'Sizzler'/3M14/3M54/3M54M1/91R1/91R2)." August 24, 
2011. 
———. "CSS-N-4 ‘Sardine’ (YJ-8/YJ-82/C-801); CSS-N-4 
‘Saccade’ (YJ-83/C-802/YJ-83A/C-802A/Noor/Ghader); YJ-
62/C-602.” November 18, 2011.  
———. "DF-21 (CSS-5)." June 21, 2011.  
———. "Fu-Feng-1/JL-9 (SS-N-22 'Sunburn')." June 22, 2011.  
———. "Jiangkai I (Type 054) Class." March 2, 2012. 
———. "Jiangkai II (Type 054A) Class." March 2, 2012. 
———. "Jiangwei I (Type 053 H2G) Class." January 3, 2012. 
———. "Jiangwei II (Type 053 H3) Class." March 2, 2012. 
———. "Luda (Type 051DT/051G/051G II) Class." January 3, 
2012. 
———. "Luhai (Type 052A) Class," March 2, 2012. 
http://jfs.janes.com/public/jfs/index.hstml. 
———. "Luhu (Type 051DT/051G/051G II) Class." January 3, 
2012. 
———. "Luyang I (Type 052B) Class." January 3, 2012. 
———. "Luyang II (Type 052C) Class." March 2, 2012. 




———. "Sovremenny Class (Project 956E/956EM)." March 2, 
2012. 
Jane's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets. "MAV6 M1400-I 
Blue Devil II." September 9, 2011. 
Jane's World Navies. "China." March 26, 2012. 
Kinney, John G., and Gordon I. Peterson. "The U.S. 
Engagement Strategy: The Size of the Fleet Really Does 
Matter!" Navy League of the United States, July 28, 
2010.  
Kline, Jeff E. “Exploring Effects of Counter-Targeting in 
Naval Warfare.” Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2012. 
Lynch, Phillip W, “Hybrid Airships: Intratheater Operations 
Cost-Benefit Analysis.” Master’s thesis, Air Force 
Institute of Technology, 2011.  
Matthews, William. "Deflated: America's Airship Revolution 
is Threatened by Mishaps, Delays, Funding Cuts." C4ISR 
Journal 11, no. 4 (May 2012): 14-18. 
MAV6. "M1400-I Optionally Manned Airship." (n.d.), 
http://mav6.com/Mav6-Blue-Devil-Airship.pdf. 
Morash, Brett James. Naval Obscuration. Newport, R.I.: 
Naval War College, 2006. 
Meyers, Chuck E., Jr. U.S. Navy Lighter-Than-Air Airship 
Program For Fleet Defense. Gordonsville, VA: 
Aerocounsel Inc., (n.d.). 
Naval Heritage and History Command. "Photograph Number 
57994." Washington, D.C.: Navy Yard, 1924, 
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/ac-usn22/z-
types/zr1-h.htm. 
Office of the Secretary of Defense. Annual Report to 
Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving 
the People's Republic of China 2011. Washington, D.C.: 





The Patuxent Partnership. "Airships, What You Think You 
Know." (n.d.), http://paxpartnership.org/ 
Knowledgebase/Attach/10%20Pax%20River%20033110-
ver01.pdf. 
Quenneville, Jerry. "Space Data: Near Space Communications 
System for Emergency Response." 2006, http:// 
www.spacedata.net/documents/SD_WhitePaper_Mil6.pdf. 
Rubel, Robert C. "The Future of the Aircraft Carrier." 
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2011, http:// 
www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/87bcd2ff-c7b6-4715-b2ed-
05df6e416b3b/The-Future-of-Aircraft-Carriers. 
Schenkenberger, Jens. “Information About ‘Non-Rigid 
Airships’.” (n.d.), http://www.zeppelinfan.de/ 
htmlseiten/englisch/luftschiff_prall.htm. 
Sherman, K. B. "Old Technologies Meet New Technologies." 
2003, http://navlog.org/lash.html. 
Starr, Barbara. "Chinese Boats Harassed U.S. Ship, 
Officials Say." CNN, May 5, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/ 
2009/WORLD/asiapcf/05/05/china.maritime.harassment/ind
ex.html?iref=allsearch 
Textron Systems Corporation. “Textron Systems Successfully 
Demonstrates Its Second Common Unmanned Surface 




Thompson, Beverly. "FALCON, Fast, Far, and First." May 7, 
2010, http://www.wpafb.af.mil/news/story.asp? 
id=123203630. 
Unmanned Air Systems Vision. "US Air Force Funds $86M Blue 
Devil 2 Demonstration Airship." April 11, 2011, 
http://www.uasvision.com/2011/04/11/us-air-force-
funds-86m-blue-devil-2-demonstration-airship/. 
United States Department of Defense. Senate Budget 
Committee: Opening Summary. Washington, DC: Capitol 





United States Library of Congress. Congressional Research 
Service. China Naval Modernization: Implications for 
U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for 
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke CRS Report RL33153. 
Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information 
and Publishing, March 23, 2012. 
United States Library of Congress. Congressional Research 
Service. Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer 
Programs:Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald 
O'Rourke CRS Report RL32109. Washington, DC: Office of 
Congressional Information and Publishing, April 19, 
2011. 
United States Navy. "U.S. Navy Active Ship Force Levels 
1886-Present." September, 2011, 
http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/org9-4.htm#2000.  
United States Naval Air Systems Command. "Hybrid Aircraft 
Envisioned Military Relevance: Report to EUCOM S&T 
Conference." Stuttgart, Germany: EUCOM, 2007. 
Williams, P. D. L., H. D. Cramp, and Kay Curtis. 
"Experimental Study of the Radar Cross-Section of 
Maritime Targets." IEEE: Electronic Circuits and 
Systems 2, no. 4 (April 1978): 129.  
Woodward, Sandy. One Hundred Days. Annapolis, MD: Naval 





INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
3. CAPT Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., USN (Ret.) 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
4. Dr. Ray Buettner 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
5. Dr. Dan Boger 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
6. CAPT Jeff Kline, USN (Ret.) 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
 
 
 
  
 
